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HOUSING RESOURCE BUNDLES: DISTRIBUTIVE 
JUSTICE AND FEDERAL LOW-INCOME HOUSING 
POLICY 
John J. Infranca * 
INTRODUCTION 
Less than one in four income-eligible households receives some 
form of rental assistance from the federal government. 1 In con-
trast with other prominent public benefit programs-including 
Temporary Aid to Needy Families ("TANF") and unemployment 
insurance-no time limit is placed on the assistance provided 
through the Department of Housing and Urban Development's 
("HUD") three major sources of rental assistance:2 public housing, 
housing choice vouchers, and Section 8 project-based rental assis-
tance.3 Recipients of federal rental assistance can continue to re-
* Assistant Professor of Law, Suffolk University Law School. Thanks to Vicki Been, 
Erin Braatz, Nestor Davidson, Ingrid Gould Ellen, Tim Iglesias, and Patrick Shin for 
comments and suggestions at various stages. Earlier versions of this article were present-
ed at the NYU Furman Center for Real Estate & Urban Policy's Fellows Workshop, the 
2013 Association for Law, Property and Society Annual Meeting, the Suffolk Law School 
Junior Faculty Workshop, and the Touro Law Center Faculty Workshop. Michael O'Brien 
provided helpful research assistance. 
1. JOINT CTR. FOR Rous. STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV., AMERICA'S RENTAL HOUSING: 
EVOLVING MAHKETS AND NEEDS 7 (2013) [hereinafter AMEHICA'S RENTAL HOUSING]; see 
also Robert C. Ellickson, 'The False Promise of the Mixed-Income Housing Project, 57 
UCLA L. REV. 983, 1003 (2010) (citing Edgar 0. Olsen, Housing Programs for Low-Income 
Households, in MEANS-TESTED THANSFER PROGHAMS IN THE UNITED STATES 365, 394 
(Robert A. Moffitt ed., 2003)) [hereinafter Olsen, Housing Programs for Low-Income 
Households] (observing that only 30% of qualified renters with incomes below the poverty 
level receive any form of federal housing aid); Editorial, The Affordable Housing Crisis, 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2012, at A30. 
2. This article uses the phrase "rental assistance" to refer only to assistance provided 
through these three programs. The phrase "housing assistance" is used to refer more 
broadly to all forms of federal support for housing. Of most importance for this article's 
analysis, the latter term includes the three rental assistance programs as well as the Low-
Income Housing 'l'ax Credit ("LIHTC") and the Home Mortgage Interest Deduction 
("HMID"). 
3. See infra Part I.D. The Personal Hesponsibility and Work Opportunity Reconcilia-
tion Act of 1996, which replaced the Aid to Families with Dependent Children program 
with TANF, imposed a lifetime maximum of sixty months assistance for families receiving 
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ceive benefits as long as they satisfy eligibility requirements.' 
Two of the most prominent forms of rental assistance-housing 
choice vouchers and public housing-typically have long waiting 
lists that are frequently closed to new applicants. 
5 
TANF. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. 
No. 104-193, § 408(a)(7), llO Stat. 2105, 2137 (1996) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 
608(a)(7)(A) (2012)). States may, however, exempt a family from the time limit in cases of 
hardship, so long as no more than 20% of recipient families receive an exemption. 42 
U.S.C. §§ 608(a)(7)(C)(i)-(ii). The unemployment insurance system provides a combination 
of federal and state benefits that differ by state, but in all states there is some limit on the 
maximum period of time one is eligible to receive unemployment compensation. See Policy 
Basics: How Many Weeks of Unemployment Compensation are Available?, CENTER ON 
BUDGET & PoL'Y PRIORITIES, http://www.cbpp.org/files/PolicyBasics_Ul_Weeks.pdf (last 
updated Mar. 2, 2015). In contrast with these programs, the federal Supplemental Securi-
ty Income Program provides an entitlement benefit-targeted to individuals who are el-
derly, blind, or disabled and have little income and few assets-to all individuals who 
qualify and does not impose time limits on receipt. See CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY 
PRIORITIES, INTRODUCTION TO THE SUPPLEMENTAL SECUHITY INCOME (SS!) PROGRAM 1 
(2014), available at http://www.cbpp.org/files/1-10-llsocsec.pdf ("SSI has guaranteed a 
minimum level of income to those who qualify."). Finally, the largest federal anti-poverty 
program, the Earned Income Tax Credit ("EITC"), operates quite distinctly from these 
benefit programs. Like many tax credits, there is no limit on how many years an individu-
al may receive the EITC. See 26 U.S.C. § 32 (2014). 
4. Public housing, housing choice vouchers, and Section 8 project-based rental assis-
tance account for approximately 90% of the five million households who receive federal 
rental assistance. See CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PHIORITIES, POLICY BASICS: FEDERAL 
RENTAL ASSISTANCE 1-3 (2013) [hereinafter FEDERAL RENTAL ASSISTANCE), available at 
http://www.cbpp.org/files/Policy Basics-housing- l-25-13RA. pdf. 
5. See, e.g., Olsen, Housing Programs for Low-Income Households, supra note 1, at 
394 ("There are long waiting lists to get into subsidized housing in all localities, and the 
length of the waiting list understates excess demand in many localities because housing 
authorities often close their waiting lists when they get sufficiently long."); Mm-AM. INST. 
ON POVERTY OF HEARTLAND ALLIANCE FOR HUMAN NEEDS & HUMAN RIGHTS, NO'I' EVEN A 
PLACE IN LINE 2007: PUllLIC HOUSING & HOUSING CHOICE VOUCI-IER CAPACITY AND 
WAITING LISTS IN ILLINOIS 2 (2007), available at http://www.wowonline.org/ourprograms 
/fess/stateresources/documents/NotEvenaPlaceinLineIL.pdf (reporting that, as of 2006, the 
waiting lists at forty-two of seventy-five Public Housing Authorities ("PHAs") in Illinois 
that provided housing vouchers were closed to new applications); Lolly Bowean, As CHA 
Saved, Residents Waited; Report: Millions in Housing Funds Stashed in Bank, Cm. 'l'mn., 
July 30, 2014, at Cl (discussing report that the Chicago Housing Authority held reserve 
funds of over $400 million while voucher and public housing waiting list of more than 
40,000 families remained closed for over five years); Mireya Navarro, On Public Housing 
Wait List, Position Unknown, N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 2013, at Al (reporting that although 
227,000 households are on waiting list for public housing in New York City, only 5400 to 
5800 units become available each year); Housing Authority Officials Overloaded with Ap-
plications, FORT-WAYNE J. GAZETTE (Mar. 30, 2014), http://www.fortwayne.com/apps/ 
pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20140330/NEWS/320142140 (reporting that when the Fort Wayne, 
Indiana Housing Authority, which provides 200 to 300 new vouchers each year, opened its 
Housing Choice Voucher waiting list for the first time in four years it received more than 
8000 applications in three days). Lengthy waiting lists for housing assistance are not a 
recent phenomenon. See U.S. DEP'T OF HOUS. & URllAN DEV., WAITING IN VAIN: AN UPDATE 
ON AMEHICA'S REN'l'AL HOUSING CRISIS ii-vi (1999) (discussing lengthening waiting times 
for public housing, particularly in larger PHAs and major cities); William C. Nussbaum, 
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The fact that only a small share of eligible individuals receive 
benefits, but these individuals are able to retain their rental as-
sistance for as long as they remain eligible, appears to contradict 
basic principles of horizontal equity-which call for similarly sit-
uated persons to be treated equally. 6 Writing over twenty years 
ago, Professor Michael Schill observed that "[u]ntil housing assis-
tance becomes an entitlement, any method of providing subsi-
dized housing will violate the norm of horizontal equity."7 Ex-
pressing a similar concern, Professor Robert Ellickson remarks 
that "[t]he fact that all other major welfare programs are de-
signed to avoid ... haphazard outcomes highlights the gravity of 
the horizontal inequity of all current methods of housing assis-
tance."8 In addition, individuals who obtain rental assistance fre-
quently have higher incomes than those denied assistance, rais-
ing vertical equity concerns. 9 Economists Amy Crews Cutts and 
Comment, Public Housing: Choosing Among Families in Need of Housing, 77 NW. U. L. 
REV. 700, 700 (1983) ("Throughout the country, the number of families seeking public 
housing vastly exceeds the number of available units."). However, waiting lists may slight-
ly overstate demand for housing assistance because a household may be on the waiting 
lists of multiple PHAs. NAT'L Low INCOME Haus. COAL. RES. NOTE #04-03, A LOOK AT 
WAITING LISTS: WHAT CAN WE LEARN FROM THE HUD APPROVED ANNUAL PLANS? (2004), 
available at h ttp://nlihc.org/ sites/defa ult/files/04-03W aitingLists. pdf. 
6. In legal scholarship, the concepts of horizontal and vertical equity are most fre-
quently invoked in the evaluation of tax policy. See, e.g., R.A. Musgrave, In Defense of an 
Income Concept, 81 HARV. L. REV. 44, 45 (1967) (defining horizontal equity to mean "peo-
ple in equal position should pay equal amounts of tax" and vertical equity to mean "people 
in unequal position should pay different amounts related in a meaningful fashion to dif-
ference in position"); James Repotti & Diane Ring, Horizontal Equity Revisited, 13 FLA. 
TAX REV. 135, 135-36 (2012) (defining horizontal equity "to mean that equals should be 
treated alike" and vertical equity "to mean that an appropriate distinction should be made 
in the treatment of people who are not alike"). 
7. Michael H. Schill, Distressed Public Housing: Where Do We Go from Here?, 60 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 497, 539 (1993) ("Public housing has long been subjected to criticism because 
it lacks horizontal equity. Housing assistance in the United States is not an entitlement; 
some have likened it to a lottery."); see also John. M. Quigley, Just Suppose: Housing Sub-
sidies for Low-Income Renters, in REVISITING HENTAL HOUSING: POLICIES, PROGRAJvlS, AND 
PRIOIUTIES 300, 309 (Nicolas P. Hetsinas & Eric S. Belsky eds., 2008) [hereinafter Quigley, 
Just Suppose] (noting "egregious failure of the current system of historically evolving 
housing subsidy programs-the horizontal inequity accorded to similarly situated, other-
wise identical, households"); William G. Grigsby & Steven C. Bourassa, Section 8: The 
Time for Fundamental Program Change?, 15 HOUSING POL'Y DEBATE 805, 811 (2004) 
("The federal government's overall low-income housing assistance effort lacks horizontal 
equity."). 
8. Ellickson, supra note 1, at 1004. 
9. See BARRY L. STEFFEN ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF HOUSING & Uim. DEV., OFFICE OF 
POL'Y DEV. & HES., WORST CASE HOUSING NEEDS 2011: HEPORT TO CONGRESS 30 (2013). 
There are 108,000 households with incomes over 120% of the Area Median Income ("AMI") 
receiving housing assistance even as 8.1 million households with incomes under 30% of 
AMI do not. Id.; see also Olsen, Housing Programs for Low-Income Households, supra note 
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Edgar Olsen assert that "[n]o coherent justification" has been 
provided for the lack of horizontal and vertical equity in current 
low-income housing programs. 10 As they argue, "no one has at-
tempted to explain why we should offer assistance to some, but 
not other, families with the same characteristics, and no one has 
provided a persuasive argument for denying assistance to the 
poorest families while providing it to otherwise identical families 
whose income is twice as large."11 This lack of horizontal and ver-
tical equity, they contend, fails to conform to plausible tax payer 
preferences. 12 Given that "under current rental subsidy policies, 
more than 70 percent of households below the poverty line are not 
served, and more than 40 percent of the households that are 
served are not in poverty," economist John Quigley declared this 
structure "indefensible."13 The lack of horizontal and vertical eq-
uity has not only been decried in academic circles. President Nix-
on, in a 1973 address to Congress, described federal housing poli-
cy as "highly inequitable," emphasizing the failure to treat "those 
in equal circumstances equally," and the arbitrary provision of 
housing to a few select families. 14 The recent Bipartisan Policy 
Center Housing Commission of 2013 shared these concerns, de-
claring that "[w]e do not believe our nation's most impoverished 
families should be subject to a lottery system or spend years on a 
waiting list to obtain access to federal rental assistance."15 
1, at 393 ("Because participants whose income rises above the upper limits applicable for 
admission into the program are rarely terminated, because exceptions to the limits are 
allowed in some cases, and because some programs have higher upper income limits, 
many households with higher incomes receive housing subsidies under means.tested hous-
ing programs."). 
10. Amy Crews Cutts & Edgar 0. Olsen, Are Section 8 Housing Subsidies Too High?, 
11 J. HOUSING ECON. 214, 235 (2002). 
11. Id. 
12. Id.; see also EDGAR 0. OLSEN, HAMILTON PROJECT, BROOKINGS INST., GETTING 
MORE FHOM LOW-INCOME HOUSING ASSISTANCE 2 (2008) [hereinafter OLSEN, LOW-INCOME 
HOUSING ASSISTANCE] (contending that "the nonentitlement nature of the current system 
is inconsistent with plausible assumptions about taxpayer preferences" and arguing "for a 
transition to an entitlement housing assistance program that relies exclusively on tenant-
based assistance"). 
13. Quigley, Just Suppose, supra note 7, at 310 (internal citations omitted). 
14. See infra notes 62-63 and accompanying text. A 1973 report by HUD prepared in 
advance of President Nixon's address to Congress discussed the issue of equity in greater 
detail. See U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. & UHBAN DEV., HOUSING IN THE SEVENTIES: A REPOHT OF 
THE NATIONAL HOUSING POLICY REVIEW 87-89 (1974) [hereinafter HOUSING IN TIIE 
SEVENTIES], available at http://www.huduser.org/Publications/pdf/HUD-968.pdf. 
15. ECON. POLICY PHOGHMI, Hous. COMM'N, BIPARTISAN POLICY CTH., HOUSING 
AMERICA'S FUTURE: NEW DIHECTIONS FOR NATIONAL POLICY 88 (2013) [hereinafter 
BIPARTISAN Hous. COMM'N OF 2013]; see also id. at 85 (criticizing an "inequitable system 
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Increasing rent burdens exacerbate the detrimental effects of 
the inequitable distribution of rental assistance. 16 The multiple 
policy goals that rental assistance is enlisted to advance can fur-
ther worsen these inequities even as they create additional ten-
sions. The General Accounting Office ("GAO"), in a 2012 review of 
the voucher program, noted how HUD policies that encourage 
voucher recipients to obtain housing in low-poverty neighbor-
hoods can increase subsidy costs because as rents in these more 
expensive neighborhoods rise, the household contribution re-
mains constant, and a higher subsidy must be provided to make 
up the difference. 17 These concerns echo those the GAO voiced a 
decade earlier: 
The overriding goal of the federal housing programs we reviewed is 
to house the poor. However, the housing programs have additional 
goals-vouchers provide mobility and neighborhood choice, and pro-
duction programs have additional goals, from creating new afforda-
ble units, to meeting the needs of the elderly or persons with disabil-
ities, to promoting community development. Whether the benefits 
derived from these additional goals justify the programs' additional 
costs is a major housing policy question.
18 
The Bipartisan Housing Commission of 2013 similarly identified 
"a tension between the goal of lowering costs and achievement of 
other policy objectives, such as improving access to neighborhoods 
f t •t ,,19 o oppor um y. 
in which housing subsidies are allocated by lottery or through ever growing waiting lists"). 
16. David A. Super, The Rise and Fall of the Implied Warranty of Habitability, 99 
CALIF. L. REV. 389, 457 (2011) ("Allowing housing costs to crowd out other necessities ex-
acerbates the inequities between the large majority of low-income people receiving no ma-
jor housing subsidies and the minority that do."). John Quigley makes a similar point in 
arguing that 
[a]ffordability is clearly the most compelling rationale for polices [sic] subsi-
dizing rental housing. The high cost of rental housing, relative to the ability 
of low-income households to pay for housing, means that these households 
have few resources left over for expenditures on other goods-food, clothing, 
medicine-that are also necessities. 
Quigley, Just Suppose, supra note 7, at 309. 
17. U.S. Gov"r ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GA0-12-300, HOUSING CHOICE VOUCHERS: 
OPTIONS EXIST TO INCREASE PROGRAM EFFICIENCIES 14 (2012) [hereinafter U.S. GoV'T 
ACCOUNTABILI'l'Y OFFICE, HOUSING CHOICE VOUCHERS] (discussing how federal targeting 
requirements and local preferences for serving "hard-to-house" and homeless individuals 
can increase per-unit subsidy amounts). 
18. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GA0-02-76, FEDERAL HOUSING ASSISTANCE: 
COMPAHING THE CHARACTERISTICS AND COSTS OF HOUSING PROGRAMS 33 (2002) [hereinaf-
ter U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, FEDERAL HOUSING ASSISTANCE]. 
19. BIPARTISAN Hous. COMM'N OF 2013, supra note 15, at 99. Scholars have also high-
lighted this and related tensions. Discussing the Gautreaux program in Chicago, James 
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Concerns about expanding the reach of federal rental assis-
tance are particularly relevant as budgets are placed under in-
creasing strain. Federal budget sequestration led to substantial 
cuts in voucher assistance. 20 The concerns that sequestration has 
raised are only the latest indications of the substantial pressure 
on all forms of federal rental assistance. Since the 1990s, the na-
tion's supply of public housing has been shrinking21 and the num-
ber of vouchers fell by approximately 150,000 between 2004 and 
2006. 22 Between 2007 and 2009 there was a 20% increase in 
households with "worst case needs" for rental housing-those 
renters who either pay half their income for housing or who live 
in severely substandard housing and do not receive rental assis-
tance. 23 Although funding for Housing Choice Vouchers increased 
over the past decade, the program's ability to reach additional 
households remained constrained by the combination of higher 
rents and lower incomes.21 Following a brief decline during the re-
cent housing downturn, rents are again rising faster than infla-
Rosenbaum observes, "[T]here is a tradeoff between seeking to move the maximum num-
ber of people to better housing and seeking to move people to only the right kinds of plac-
es." .James K Rosenbaum, Changing the Geography of Opportunity by Expanding Residen-
ticil Choice: Lessons from the Gautreaux Program, 6 HOUSING PoL'Y DEBATE 231, 256 
(1995). Analyzing the specific tension between the dictates of the FHA and a statutory 
preference for siting LIHTC developments in low-income neighborhoods, Myron Orfield 
notes that ''the deep legal and philosophical contradiction in the United States between 
civil rights guarantees-particularly the duty to affirmatively further fair housing-and 
state and federal low-income housing policy." Myron Orfield, Racial Integration and 
Community Reuitalization: Applying the Fair Housing Act to the Low Income Housing 1'ax 
Credit, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1747, 1753 (2005) (arguing that fair housing duty should take 
priority before other policy considerations). 
20. Douglas Rice, New Report Documents Growing "Crisis of Affordability" for Renters 
Off the Charts Blog, CENTER ON IlUDGET & POL'Y PHIORITIES (June 30, 2014, 3:59 PM): 
http://www.offthechartsblog.org/new-report-documents-growing-crisis-of-affordability-for-
renters/ ("[T]he number of families using Housing Choice Vouchers, the most common 
form of federal rental assistance, fell by more than 70,000 in 2013 due to across-the-board 
sequestration cuts."); see also Michael Laris, Budget Cuts Threaten to Upend Fairfax 
Man's Fragile Existence, WASH. POST, Apr. 22, 2013, at BOl (discussing the denial of assis-
tance for 150 individuals and families in Fairfax County, Virginia due to loss of $2.5 mil-
lion in federal funds). 
21. ALEX F. SCHWARTZ, HOUSING POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 197 (::ld ed. 2015) 
[hereinafter SCHWARTZ, HOUSING POLICY] ("Although this new public housing often offers 
higher quality accommodations than what stood before, there are fewer units than before 
and access to this housing is more restricted. If this trend continues, public housing will 
become decreasingly available to the lowest income families with the greatest need for af-
fordable housing."). 
22. Id. at 261. 
23. IlIPAHTISAN Hous. COMM'N OF 2013, supra note 15, at 82-84. The number of indi-
viduals with worst case housing needs grew by 18% between 2001 and 2007. Id. at 84. 
24. Nv!ERICA'S RENTAL HOUSING, supra note 1, at 8. 
2015] HOUSING RESOURCE BUNDLES 1077 
tion, even as renter incomes decline.2'' The number of very low-
income households, who lack rental assistance and pay more than 
half of their income for housing, increased by 43% between 2007 
and 2011.26 
To focus solely on the distribution of rental assistance and the 
disparities between those who receive benefits and those who re-
main on waitlists is to assume that the direct recipients of rental 
assistance are its only beneficiaries. However, rental assistance 
might be thought of instead as a means of serving broader and 
more diffuse public policy goals, such as eliminating concentra-
tions of poverty or encouraging economic or racial integration. 
The Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, which in-
stituted the precursor to the present Section 8 Housing Choice 
Voucher program, identified a broad set of objectives that includ-
ed reducing segregation of income groups, promoting more di-
verse and vital neighborhoods, revitalizing deteriorating neigh-
borhoods, aiding lower-income families in "obtaining a decent 
place to live," and "promoting economically mixed housing."21 On-
ly one of these goals-aiding families in obtaining a decent place 
to live-reflects a focus on individual recipients rather than the 
broader public. Placing time limits on individual benefits or re-
ducing benefit amounts in the pursuit of a more equitable distri-
bution of assistance might imperil the advancement of broader 
objectives. From this perspective, the distribution of rental assis-
tance among individual recipients is only of importance to the ex-
tent this distribution furthers certain programmatic goals. Ques-
tions of equity and distributive justice are secondary if not 
irrelevant. 
Given increasingly limited resources and the growing demand 
for rental assistance, difficult decisions must be made regarding 
how to satisfy the range of, at times conflicting, programmatic 
goals. Although for at least four decades legal scholars, econo-
mists, public policy experts, and politicians have denounced the 
25. WILL FISCHER & BAHBARA SARD, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL'Y PIUOIUTIES, CIIART 
IlOOK: FEDEHAL HOUSING SPENDING IS POORLY MATCHED TO NEED, 'l'ILT TOWARD WELL-
0FF HOMEOWNERS LEAVES S'l'IWGGLING Low-INCOME RENTERS WITHOUT HELP (2013) 
[hereinafter FISCHER & SARD, CHART IlOOK], available at http://www.cbpp.org/cms/?fa= 
view&id=4067. 
26. Editorial, The Affordable Housing Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2012, at A30. 
27. Pub. L. No. 93-383, tit. II § 8(a), 88 Stat. 633, 662 (1974) (codified as amended at 
42 U.S.C. § 1437f (2006)); see id. tit. I. § lOl(c), 88 Stat. at 634-35 (identifying the broad 
set of objectives for the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974). 
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inequities in existing rental housing policy, no one has provided a 
detailed analysis of the specific ways in which this policy departs 
from norms of distributive justice and of how it might be made 
more equitable. While proposals have been put forth for pro-
grammatic reforms, these reforms have not been linked to a nor-
mative account of what would constitute an equitable distribution 
of rental assistance. 
This article moves the conversation beyond simply decrying in-
equities in federal rental assistance policy and instead carefully 
analyzes that policy in light of specific theories of distributive jus-
tice. Drawing on the philosophical literature, it outlines five ac-
counts of distributive justice, and then analyzes the specifics of 
existing policy and their effects on benefit distribution in light of 
those theories. This article then proposes a new structure for all 
forms of federal housing assistance,28 which would allow recipi-
ents to choose among a set of "housing resource bundles." This 
approach satisfies the requirements of distributive justice while 
indirectly enabling federal housing policy to continue to embrace 
a plurality of programmatic goals. 
Questions of equity are not the sole considerations that should 
shape the structure of rental assistance. Nonetheless, as legal 
philosopher Ronald Dworkin observed, "even those who do not 
think that equality is the whole story in political morality usually 
concede that it is part of the story, so that it is at least a point in 
favor of some political arrangement."29 In a similar vein, HUD's 
1974 report, Housing in the Seventies noted that, although "al-
most any housing assistance program-indeed, virtually any pro-
gram of assistance to anyone-will have some inequities," there 
remains a need to address the question of "whether alternative 
housing programs or alternative policies for addressing the low 
income problem will perform better or more poorly in terms of the 
28. See supra note 2 (explaining and contrasting use of terms "housing assistance" 
and "rental assistance"). 
29. Ronald Dworkin, What Is Equality? Part L· Equality of Welfare, 10 PHIL. & Pun. 
AFFS. 185, 187 (1981) [hereinafter Dworkin, Equality of Welfare]; see also Jeremy Wal-
dron, Socioeconomic Rights and Theories of Justice, 48 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 773, 779 (2011) 
("Theories of justice may be a little too abstract for the taste of those who are used to line-
item consideration of some quite concretely specified rights, but their raison d'etre is the 
consideration of competing claims and interests in a distributive context in which it is un-
derstood that not everyone can get what they want or even what we ideally would like to 
secure for them."). 
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equity criteria."30 With these considerations in mind, this article 
brings a more sophisticated analysis of specific equity criteria to 
bear on debates over federal affordable housing policy. 
The article proceeds in three parts. The first part begins by re-
viewing the history of federal rental assistance policy and high-
lights changes in program priorities, their effects on the distribu-
tion of assistance, and tensions between stated priorities. Part I 
concludes by briefly discussing prior critiques of existing housing 
policy and proposed reforms. Part II analyzes existing federal 
rental assistance policy in light of four theories of distributive 
justice-equality of welfare, desert theory, equality of resources, 
and the Rawlsian difference principles-as well as Amartya Ben's 
capability approach. This article evaluates how each framework 
might suggest reforms and considers the extent to which these 
theories align with the stated goals of federal housing programs. 
The final section of Part II briefly addresses whether there are 
justifications for treating rental assistance differently from other 
public benefit programs. A companion paper will explore the ex-
tent to which rental assistance should be understood as a distinct 
property interest that may justify certain distributional inequi-
ties. Finally, Part III argues that existing housing policies should 
be reformed to better accord with an equality of resources theory 
and certain concerns highlighted by the capability approach. Spe-
cifically, this article suggests that "housing resource bundles," a 
limited menu of bundles of housing resources of equal value, 
would provide for a more equitable distribution of finite benefits 
while advancing broader programmatic goals. 
The final section of Part III reveals an additional virtue of the 
housing resource bundle approach: it provides a mechanism for 
incorporating the home mortgage interest deduction-the largest 
source of federal support for housing31-into the distributional 
analysis and the proposed reforms. The mortgage interest deduc-
tion skews the distribution of all federal housing assistance-both 
direct subsidies and tax expenditures-towards higher income 
households.32 Distributing only rental assistance through housing 
resource bundles would achieve a more just distribution among 
30. HOUSING IN THE SEVENTIES, supra note 14, at 89. 
31. MAGGIE MCCARTY ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., HL34591, OVERVIEW OF 
FEDERAL HOUSING ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS AND POLICY 1 (2008). 
32. See infra Part II.C (discussing distribution of HMID). 
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those low-income individuals eligible for this assistance. Attain-
ing a more equitable distribution of all federal housing assis-
tance, however, requires incorporating the mortgage interest de-
duction into the housing resource bundle approach. 
I. HISTORY AND GOALS OF FEDERAL RENTAL ASSISTANCE 
Federal rental assistance falls into two broad categories: ten-
ant-based and project-based assistance. Recipients of tenant-
based assistance through the Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher 
program must find and rent a privately-owned unit that satisfies 
program standards.33 Recipients may move to a new unit and re-
tain assistance, however doing so can prove challenging in prac-
tice. 31 In contrast, project-based assistance-including both public 
and government-assisted housing, but excluding privately owned 
housing ("project-based Section 8")-attaches to the unit itself 
and a household typically loses assistance when it moves. 35 Hous-
ing Choice Vouchers (often referred to simply as "Section 8 
vouchers"), project-based Section 8, and public housing-the ma-
jor federal rental assistance programs that HUD administers-
share three important similarities: they target a significant por-
tion of assistance towards extremely low-income ("ELI") house-
holds (those earning less than 30% of the area median income 
("AMI")), recipient households pay at least 30% of their income 
toward rent, and the programs typically have very long waiting 
33. The Housing Choice Vouchers program is the largest federal program providing 
housing assistance to low-income persons. Introduction to the Housing Voucher Program, 
CENTEH ON BUDGET & POL'Y PHIOHITIES, http://www.cbpp.org/files/5-15-09hous.pdf (last 
updated May 15, 2009). As of 2008, HUD devoted about 40% of its budget to tenant-based 
rental assistance. NAT'L Low INCOME Hous. COAL., FY 2010 BUDGET CHAHT FOH SELECTED 
PROGHAMS (2009). 
34. OLSEN, LOW-INCOME HOUSING ASSISTANCE, supra note 12, at 7. HUD has pro-
posed a rule that would change the regulations governing public housing agency consorti-
um, with the goals of improving administrative efficiency and locational choice for eligible 
households. Streamlining Requirements Applicable to Formation of Consortia by Public 
Housing Agencies, 79 Fed. Reg. 40,019, 40,020 (July 11, 2014) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. 
pt. 5 and 943); see also Andrew Jordan Greenlee, A Different Lens: Administrative Perspec-
tives on Portability in Illinois' Housing Choice Voucher Program, 21 HOUSING POL'Y. 
DEllATE 377, 378 (2011) (drawing on qualitative interviews to analyze how administration 
of voucher portability at PHA level affects voucher recipient mobility). 
35. See Project Based Vouchers, Frequently Ashed Questions, U.S. DEP'T OF Haus. & 
Urrn. DEV., http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/documents/huddoc?id=DOC_9157.pdf (last vis-
ited Apr. 3, 2015); C'm. ON BUDGET & POLICY PIUOHI'l'IES, POLICY BASICS: SECTION 8 
Pno.rncT-BASED RENTAL ASSISTANCE 1-2 (2013), available at http://www.cbpp.org/cms/?fa 
=view&id=3891. 
1----------
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lists.:iG As of 2013, these programs together subsidized approxi-
mately 4.4 million housing units: 2.4 million through Housing 
Choice Vouchers, 1.2 million through public housing, and 840,000 
through project-based Section 8.37 
Understanding how the current mix of federal rental assistance 
programs developed and the often divergent policy goals they are 
enlisted to serve will help inform the evaluation of existing pro-
grams in light of distributive justice concerns and the potential of 
particular reforms. 38 Accordingly, the first section of this part re-
views the history of federal rental assistance, focusing on the de-
velopment of HUD's three main rental assistance programs: pub-
lic housing, Housing Choice Vouchers, and project-based Section 
8. The second section reviews current income targeting and bene-
fit distribution by income level for these three programs. The 
third section broadens the discussion to consider two other major 
federal programs: the LIHTC and the HMID. 
The final section of this part reviews a representative sample of 
proposed reforms to existing rental assistance programs. These 
proposals set the stage for the article's central discussion, an 
evaluation of the current allocation of rental assistance resources 
from the perspective of four theories of distributive justice and 
the capability approach and a subsequent critique of broader fed-
eral housing assistance policy, including the LIHTC and HMID. 
In the course of this analysis in Part II, and in the more detailed 
discussion of this article's proposed housing resource bundle ap-
proach in Part III, the article occasionally returns to these pro-
posals and explains how this approach better accords with princi-
ples of distributive justice while also furthering many of the 
broader policy goals that rental assistance is enlisted to serve. 
36. MCCAH'l'Y ET AL., supra note 31, at 24; see also Olsen, Housing Programs for Low-
Income Households, supra note 1, at 379 ("Since the 1974 Housing Act, public housing, 
Section 236, and all variants of Section 8 have had a common set of income limits."). 
37. See Picture of Subsidized Households 2013, U.S. DEP'•r OF HOUSING & URB. DEV., 
http://www.huduser.org/portal/datasets/picture/yearlydata.html (last visited Apr. 3, 2015) 
[hereinafter Picture of Subsidized Households 2013]. 
38. Cf Quigley, Just Suppose, supra note 7, at 300, 311-12 (proposing, as ideal, trans-
formation of existing housing assistance programs into entitlement that operates akin to 
food stamps or EITC and discussing "importance of history" and "path dependency of poli-
cy"). 
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A. The Evolution of Public Housing, Project-Based Section 8, and 
Housing Vouchers 
1. The 1930s and 1940s: The Introduction of Public Housing 
The federal government introduced rental assistance for low. 
income households-in the form of public housing-through the 
Housing Act of 1937.39 The Act sought to "remedy the acute short-
age" of adequate housing and encourage infrastructure invest-
ment during a period of high unemployment. 40 At the time of its 
creation "[a] primary purpose of the public housing program was 
to act as an employment program to stimulate the construction 
industry, with housing as a secondary goal." 11 The Housing Act of 
1949 expanded this assistance and declared the oft-quoted goal of 
providing "a decent home and a suitable living environment for 
every American family." 12 The Act declared a national housing 
policy that included "community development" and "the elimina-
tion of substandard and other inadequate housing through the 
clearance of slums and blighted areas."n In addition to alleviating 
the shortage of housing for specific families, it sought, through 
the provision of adequate housing, to contribute "to the develop-
ment and redevelopment of communities and to the advancement 
of the growth, wealth, and security of the N ation.'"14 
These evolving early programmatic goals reveal a dynamic ten-
sion in federal housing policy between individual assistance and 
community, or place-based assistance. 45 The housing industry's 
39. BIPARTISAN Rous. CoMM'N OF 2013, supra note 15, at 85. See generally Michael H. 
Schill, Privatizing Federal Low Income Housing Assistance: The Case of Public Housing, 
75 COHNELL L. REV. 878, 894-96 (1990) (providing a short history of public housing). 
40. Quigley, Just Suppose, supra note 7, at 301 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
41. Tim Iglesias, Our Pluralist Housing Ethics and the Struggle for Affordability, 42 
WAKE FOHEST L. REV. 511, 548 n.186 (2007) (citing LAWHENCE M. FHIEDMAN, 
GOVEHNMENT AND SLUM HOUSING: A CENTUHY OF FHUSTHATION 104-06 (1968)); see also 
EUGENE J. MEEHAN, PUULIC HOUSING POLICY: CONVENTION VEHSUS REALITY 171 (1975) 
("The major concerns built into the legislation had to do with the construction of housing 
and not the provision of housing-in-use, with the latent function of construction in elimi-
nating slums and providing employment and not the satisfaction of the need for shelter."). 
42. Housing Act of 1949, Pub. L. No. 81-171, 63 Stat. 413 (1949) (codified as amended 
at 42 u.s.c. § 1441 (2012)); see also BIPAHTISAN HOUSING COMM'N OF 2013, supra note 15, 
at 85-86; BIPAJtTISAN MILLENNIAL Hous. COMM'N, MEETING Oun NA'l'ION'S HOUSING 
CHALLENGES 22-23 (2002) [hereinafter BIPARTISAN MILLENNIAL Hous. COMM'N]. 
43. 42 u.s.c. § 1441. 
44. Id. 
45. See Nestor M. Davidson, Reconciling People and Place in Housing and Community 
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contribution towards full employment and the broader economy is 
no longer a central component of debates over rental assistance 
policy-particularly given the move away from housing produc-
tion towards demand-side subsidies. Nonetheless, rental assis-
tance policy remains a prominent vehicle for furthering broader 
social and economic goals. 46 Pursuit of these goals can frequently 
exacerbate the inequities created by an unequal distribution of 
benefits. 47 
2. The 1950s and 1960s: Private Housing Markets, Mobility, and 
Tensions Between Income Targeting and Integration 
The development of public housing for low-income households 
remained a major focus of federal rental assistance throughout 
the 1950s.48 The Housing Act of 1959 sought to complement this 
housing by providing incentives for private developers to build 
housing for low- and moderate-income households.49 This led to 
the creation of the HUD in 1965.50 In the 1960s, the federal gov-
ernment began permitting PHAs-the local entities that adminis-
ter public housing-to rent privately owned units for tenants, a 
precursor to housing vouchers. 51 By allowing recipients to live in a 
range of privately-owned units, rather than housing developed 
specifically for low-income renters, these program changes 
"opened up new opportunities for both geographic mobility and 
economic-perhaps even racial-integration."52 
As operating and maintenance costs rose and resident income 
declined over the course of the 1960s, many public-housing resi-
dents were spending nearly three-quarters of their income on 
rent and utilities.53 In 1969, to alleviate these burdens, Congress 
Development Policy, 16 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 1, 2 (2009). 
46. See id. at 10. 
47. Seeid. 
48. See MCCARTY ET AL., supra note 31, at 3. 
49. See id. 
50. Department of Housing and Urban Development Act, Pub. L. No. 89-174, 79 Stat. 
667 (1965) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 3532 (2012)). 
51. BIPAR1'ISAN MILLENNIAL Rous. COMM'N, supra note 42, ut 23. 
52. See Charles J. Orlebeke, The Evolution of Low-Income Housing Policy, 1949 to 
1999, 11 HOUSING POL'Y DEBATE 489, 502-03 (2000) (discussing the Section 23 Leased 
Housing program introduced in 1965); see also Lawrence M. Friedman & ,James E. Krier, 
A New Lease on Life: Section 23 Housing and the Poor, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 611, 612, 614 
(1968). 
53. BIPARTISAN Rous. COMM'N OF 2013, supra note 15, at 86. 
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adopted an amendment that limited tenant rents in public hous-
ing to 25% of a tenant's income. 54 This amendment served to "cod-
ify[] an income-based rent structure in federal housing pro-
grams."55 Income-based rent structures remain a prominent 
component of federal rental assistance and govern the determina-
tion of rent levels for the three programs under discussion. 
During this same period, the Housing and Urban Development 
Act of 1968 reemphasized the provision of housing to families 
with the lowest incomes. The Act declared that the administra-
tion of housing programs "designed to assist families with in-
comes so low that they could not otherwise decently house them-
selves" must give "the highest priority and emphasis . . . to 
meeting the housing needs of those families for which the nation-
al goal has not become a reality."56 Yet in the same year the Fair 
Housing Act ("FHA") placed new emphasis on ending racial dis-
crimination in housing. As the FHA's legislative history makes 
clear, its proponents intended that it would not only expand indi-
vidual residential choice, but would also "foster racial integration 
for the benefit of all Americans," partly through the operation of 
HUD programs.57 The FHA requires that HUD administer its 
programs in a manner that affirmatively furthers the policy of 
providing "fair housing throughout the United States."58 
Applying this provision in a 1970 case challenging an urban 
renewal program, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit described "a progression in the thinking of Con-
gress" from a minimal requirement in 1949 that HUD "act neu-
trally on the issue of racial segregation," through a demand in 
1964 "to prevent discrimination in housing" due to planning deci-
sions, and on to the 1968 Act's requirement "to act affirmatively 
to achieve fair housing."59 Given the potential tensions between 
fair housing goals and prioritizing assistance to the lowest-
54. Id. ("The Brooke Amendment that established the 25 percent of income limit is 
responsible for the income-based rent structure that exists to this day in federal housing 
programs."). 
55. McCAHTY ET AL., supra note 31, at 4. 
56. Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968, Pub. L. 90-448, 82 Stat. 476 (1968) 
(codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1701t (2012)). 
57. HOBEHT G. SCHWEMM, HOUSING DISCRIMINATION LAW AND LITIGATION § 2.3. Con-
gressman Ryan stated that the law's goals included "achiev[ing] the aim of an integrated 
society." 114 Cong. Rec. 9591 (1968). 
58. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601, 3608(d)(e)(5) (2012). 
59. Shannon v. HUD, 436 F.2d 809, 816 (3d Cir. 1970). 
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income eligible households, it is not surprising that a 197 4 HUD 
report tentatively noted: "[a]though the subsidy programs have 
somewhat different and overlapping target groups, it neverthe-
less appears to be Congress' intent that, taken as a whole, these 
programs should serve equitably the housing needs of lower in-
come households."60 While more equitably serving the needs of 
lower-income households accords with a concern with distributive 
justice, the role that distributive justice should play in allocating 
benefits becomes less clear when fair housing and other policy 
priorities move to the forefront. 
3. The 1970s and 1980s: Priorities Shift from Supply-Side to 
Demand-Side Programs 
In 1973, the Nixon administration imposed a moratorium on 
subsidies for housing production.61 In an address to Congress that 
same year, Nixon criticized the quality of public housing devel-
opments, while asserting this was not the only problem with fed-
erally-assisted housing: "Our present approach is also highly in-
equitable. Rather than treating those in equal circumstances 
equally, it arbitrarily selects only a few low income families to 
live in Federally supported housing, while ignoring others."62 Nix-
on argued that direct cash assistance would be the most equitable 
and efficient means of achieving the "goal of a decent home for all 
Americans."63 As Nixon's address highlights, the shift from a focus 
on subsidies for production towards demand-side housing subsi-
dies occurred in the context of increasing concern for the distribu-
tional fairness of federal rental assistance. 
Soon after Nixon's address, the Housing and Community De-
velopment Act of 197461 amended the Housing Act of 1937 to ere-
60. HOUSING IN THE SEVENTIES, supra note 14, at 97 (emphasis added). 
61. Orlebeke, supra note 52, at 489. 
62. Hichard Nixon, Special Message to the Congress Proposing Legislation and Outlin-
ing Administration Actions to Deal with Federal Housing Policy, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT' 
(Sept. 19, 1973) [hereinafter Nixon, Special Message to Congress], available at http://www. 
presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=3968. Nixon's message drew upon a report by HUD entitled 
"Housing in the Seventies." See HOUSING IN THE SEVENTIES, supra note 14. 
63. Nixon, Special Message to Congress, supra note 62. 
64. Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-383, 88 Stat. 
633, 633-34 (1974) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). As the Senate 
Committee Report on the Act explains, "Section 8 provides for continuation, on a modified 
basis, of the leased housing assistance program now set forth in Section 23 of the United 
States Housing Act." S. REP. No. 93-693, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4273, 4314. 
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ate the precursor to the Section 8 voucher program,60 known as 
the Section 8 Existing Housing Certificate Program. 66 In addition 
to "aiding lower-income families in obtaining a decent place to 
live," the 1974 Act's stated objectives included "promoting eco-
nomically mixed housing."67 The new program was intended "as a 
more flexible means of delivering rental housing assistance to the 
lowest-income households by focusing on rental subsidies to or on 
behalf of tenants rather than subsidies directly paid to develop-
ers."68 The program assisted those with incomes up to 80% of 
AMI.60 It relied on an income-based structure and paid the differ-
ence between 25% of a tenant's income and the fair market rent 
("FMR"). 70 The tenant contribution was later raised to 30% of in-
come, the current standard.71 In the early 1980s, the federal gov-
ernment introduced the freestanding voucher program, which dif-
fered in two important ways from the Section 8 Existing Housing 
Certificate Program. 72 The new program paid the difference be-
tween 30% of a recipient's income and a set payment standard.73 
A household was permitted to pay more than 30% of their income 
65. BIPAHTISAN MILLENNIAL Hous. COMM'N, supra note 42, at 23. 
66. SCHWAHTZ, HOUSING POLICY, supra note 21at227. 
67. Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-383, 88 Stat. 
633 (1974) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(a) (2012)). 
68. BIPARTISAN Hous. COMM'N OI•' 2013, supra note 15, at 86. 
69. SCHWAHTZ, HOUSING POLICY, supra note 21, at 228. As Casey Dawkins observes 
"The original income-targeting goals of the Section 8 Program were modest." Casey J'. 
Dawkins, Income Targeting of Housing Vouchers: What Happened After the Quality Hous-
ing and Work Responsibility Act?, 9 CITYSCAPE 69, 71. (2007). However, a 1975 amendment 
targeted assistance towards lower-income families, adding a requirement that 30% of all 
assistance go to families with very low incomes ("VLis"), incomes of less than 50% of the 
AMI. Id. 
70. Fair market rent means the rent, including the cost of utilities (except tele-
phone), as established by HUD, pursuant to this subpart, for units of varying 
sizes (by number of bedrooms), that must be paid in the market area to rent 
privately owned, existing, decent, safe and sanitary rental housing of modest 
(non-luxury) nature with suitable amenities. 
Housing and Urban Development Rule, 24 C.F.R. § 888.lll(b) (1999). An FMR is annually 
calculated for each market using a methodology outlined at 24 C.F.R. § 888.113(a). 
71. Charles L. Edson, Affordable Housing-An Intimate History, in THE LEGAL GUIDE 
TO AFFORDABLE HOUSING DEVELOPMENT 10 (Tim Iglesias & Rochelle E. Lento eds., 2d ed. 
2011). Initially, the required household contribution was 15% for large families or those 
with exceptional medical or other expenses and between 15% and 25% for other families. 
See DANILO PELLETIERE, NAT'L Low INCOME Hous. COAL., GETTING TO THE HEART OF 
HOUSING'S FUNDAMENTAL QUESTION: How MUCH CAN A FAMILY AFFORD? 3-4 (2008). 
72. SCHWAHTZ, HOUSING POLICY, supra note 21, at 228. 
73. Id. 
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to obtain a more expensive unit or could realize some of the sav-
ings for a unit that rented for less than the payment standard.74 
In addition to this expansion of demand-side assistance during 
the 1970s, the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974 
instituted the project-based Section 8 program, which "[fJor the 
purpose of aiding lower-income families in obtaining a decent 
place to live and of promoting economically mixed housing" pro-
vided financial assistance "to existing, newly constructed, and 
substantially rehabilitated housing."75 The legislation introducing 
the program required that at least 30% of assisted families, at the 
time of initial renting, must qualify as very low-income house-
holds. 76 Since 1983 there has been no new funding of project-
based Section 8 contracts for either new construction or rehabili-
tation. 77 However, the program continues to support approximate-
ly 840,000 households. 78 Although it served to increase the supply 
of housing, project-based Section 8 differed from public housing in 
that, like tenant-based vouchers, it enlisted the private market in 
providing housing and enabled the deconcentration of assisted 
households. 
4. The Quality Housing and Work Responsibility Act of 1998: 
Reducing Concentrations of Poverty and Increasing Local 
Control 
In 1998, the Quality Housing and Work Responsibility Act 
("QHWRA")79 merged the certificate and voucher programs into 
the current Housing Choice Voucher program.80 The new name re-
flected a programmatic emphasis on enabling recipients to choose 
74. Edson, supra note 71, at 18; SCHWARTZ, HOUSING POLICY, supra note 21, at 228; 
see also U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. & URBAN DEV., SECTION 8 TENANT-BASED HOUSING 
ASSISTANCE: A LOOK BACK AFTER 30 YEARS 5-6 (2000) [hereinafter A LOOK BACK AFTER 
30 YEARS], available at http://www.huduser.org/portal/publications/pubasstflook.html ("If 
a family rented at less than the payment standard, it would keep some or all of the sav-
ings."). 
75. Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-383, 88 Stat. 
633, 662 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1437f (2012)). 
76. See 42 U.S.C. § 1437f (c)(7) (2012) (repealed Oct. 21, 1998). 
77. FURMAN CTR. FOR REAL ESTATE & URBAN POLICY, STA'l'E OF NEW YOHK CI'I'Y'S 
SUBSIDIZED HOUSING: 2011, at 31 (2011), [hereinafter NEW Yorm: CITY'S SUBSIDIZED 
HOUSING], available at http://furmancenter.org/files/publications/SHIP _FINAL. pdf. 
78. See supra note 37 and accompanying text. 
79. Quality Housing and Work Hesponsibility Act, Pub. L. No. 105-276, 112 Stat. 
2461, 2518 (1998) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1437f (2012)). 
80. SCHWAHTZ, HOUSING POLICY, supra note 21, at 228. 
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the location where they use their assistance to obtain housing. 81 
The QHWRA established many of the current features of both 
public housing and voucher programs. Housing authorities are 
permitted to set payment standards at 90% to 110% of FMR, and 
as high as 120% of FMR under certain circumstances, a change 
designed to enable beneficiaries to move to higher opportunity lo-
cations where units are likely to be more expensive.82 A partici-
pant can spend more than this standard, but they must then pay 
the full difference between the rent and the standard, plus 30% of 
his income.83 FMRs are typically set at the fortieth percentile of 
the area median rent for "standard quality rental housing 
units."81 The FMR is raised to the fiftieth percentile in more ex-
pensive metropolitan areas. 85 HUD can approve "exception pay-
ment" standards outside these ranges at the request of a PHA. 86 A 
recent controversy involving the Chicago Housing Authority's use 
of "exception payments" for high cost apartments revealed some 
payments as high as 300% of the FMR.87 Assuming identical in-
81. See SUSAN J. POPKIN ET AL., UlmAN INST., A DECADE OF HOPE VI: RESEAHCH 
FINDINGS AND POLICY CHALLENGES 15 (2004). 
82. A LOOK BACK AFTER 30 YEARS, supra note 7 4, at 11; see also U.S. DEP'T OF Ho us. 
& URBAN DEV., HOUSING CHOICE VOUCHER PROGRAM GUIDEBOOK, 7420.lOG, at 7-2 (2001), 
available at http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/program_offices/public_indian_hou 
sing/programs/hcv/forms/guidebook. 
83. 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(c)(l) (2012); see also U.S. Gov''l' ACCOUNTABILI'l'Y OFFICE 
HOUSING CHOICE VOUCHERS, supra note 17, at 4. If a household's rent is less than the ap'. 
plicable payment standard, the monthly assistance they receive 
shall be equal to the amount by which the rent (including the amount allowed 
for tenant-paid utilities) exceeds the greatest of the following amounts, 
rounded to the nearest dollar: 
(i) 30 percent of the monthly adjusted income of the family. 
(ii) 10 percent of the monthly gross income of the family. 
(iii) If the family is receiving payments for welfare assistance from a 
public agency and a part of those payments, adjusted in accordance 
with the actual housing costs of the family, is specifically designated by 
that agency to meet the housing costs of the family, the portion of 
those payments that is so designated. 
42 U.S.C. § 1437f(o)(2)(A). If rent exceeds the payment standard, the monthly assistance is 
equal to the payment standard less the greater of the three amounts listed. Id. § 
1437f(o)(2)(B). 
84. 24 C.F.R. §§ 888.113(a)-(b) (2014). 
85. Id .. §§ 888.113(c)(i)-(iii). 
86. PUB. & INDIAN Hous., U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. & URBAN DEV., Notice PIH 2013-18 
(HA), REVISION FOR REQUESTS FOR EXCEPTION PAYMENT STANDARDS FOR PERSONS WITH 
DISABILITIES AS A REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION (2013), available at http://portal.hud. 
gov/hudportal/documents/huddoc?id=pih2013-18. pdf. 
87. Alby Gailun, CHA 'Supervoucher' Program Sparks Federal Probe, CHAIN'S Cm. 
Bus. (Aug. 5, 2014), http://www.chicagobusiness.com/realestate/20140805/CRED03/1408 
09923/cha-voucher-program-prompts-federal-probe (reporting increase in approval of new 
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comes, a recipient using a voucher in an expensive location with a 
higher payment standards and a more generous calculation of the 
FMR, will receive a significantly larger sum of assistance than a 
recipient living in a less-expensive location. 
The QHWRA also permitted voucher holders to move with a 
voucher anywhere in the United States88 and-of particular inter-
est in terms of benefit distribution-it declared that ELI house-
holds (earning less than 30% of AMI) must receive 75% of the 
vouchers issued by a public housing authority each year. 89 The 
QHWRA changes mandate that a higher share of assistance be 
directed towards lower-income households while allowing PHAs 
to spend more on those households, potentially reducing the total 
number of households served. Additional changes to both vouch-
ers and public housing were designed to reduce concentrations of 
poverty within public housing.90 
Finally, the QHWRA eliminated federal preferences, which di-
rected assistance towards those paying more than 50% of their 
exception payments from seven in 2011 to 364 in 2014); see also Bowean, supra note 5, 
(reporting that "super vouchers" account for "less than 2 percent of [CHA's] portfolio"). 
88. 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(r)(l) (2012). 
89. Id. § 1437f(n)(b)(l); see also 24 C.F.R. § 983.251(c)(6) ("Not less than 75 percent of 
the families admitted to a PHA's tenant-based and project-based voucher programs during 
the PHA fiscal year from the PHA waiting list shall be extremely low-income families. The 
income-targeting requirements at 24 C.F.H. 982.201(b)(2) apply to the total of admissions 
to the PHA's project-based voucher program and tenant-based voucher program during 
the PHA fiscal year from the PHA waiting list for such programs."). To qualify for Section 
8 project-based assistance, a household must have an income that does not exceed 80% of 
the AMI. CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PIUORITIES, POLICY BASICS: INTRODUCTION TO PUBLIC 
HOUSING, 2 (2013), available at http://www.cbpp.org/files/policybasics-housing.pdf. At 
least 40% of units in each development that become available in a given year must be 
filled by a household with an income no greater than 30% of AMI. Id. 
90. SCHWARTZ, HOUSING POLICY, supra note 21, at 168; see also Dawkins, supra note 
69, at 70 (discussing legislation's focus on reducing poverty concentration in public hous· 
ing, encouraging self-sufficiency, and increasing flexibility). The federal government pur· 
sued a number of additional initiatives in the 1990s aimed at deconcentrating poverty or 
furthering racial integration. SCHWARTZ, HOUSING POLICY, supra note 21, at 247. These 
efforts, which were given reduced priority during the second Bush administration, includ· 
ed most notably the Moving to Opportunity Demonstration Program and Hope VI. Moving 
to Opportunity was launched in 1993 as an experiment with the goal of measuring the im· 
pact of increased mobility and improvements in neighborhood opportunities on low-income 
residents of public housing. Id. at 248. Volunteer program participants were randomly as· 
signed to three groups, one of which remained in public housing or project-based Section 8 
housing, one of which received Section 8 vouchers to be used anywhere, and a treatment 
group that received vouchers that could only be used in low-poverty neighborhoods. Id. at 
248-49; see also POPKIN ET AL., supra note 81, at 14 ("A central premise of HOPE VI-and 
of the broader public housing transformation effort that began in the 1990s-was that the 
overconcentration of profoundly poor, nonworking households was a major contributor to 
the high levels of social problems in distressed public housing."). 
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income towards rent, living in substandard housing, experiencing 
homelessness, or who were involuntarily displaced.91 This granted 
PHAs greater flexibility in establishing local preferences to guide 
tenant selection, although they remain bound by the requirement 
that 75% of vouchers and project-based units must go to ELI 
households.92 A 2000 report by HUD's Office of Policy Develop-
ment and Research, evaluating how the QHWRA affected the dis-
cretionary authority of PHAs noted that even though the 
QHWRA granted substantial discretion to establish policies-
particularly regarding tenant selection-to meet specific local 
priorities, it required PHAs "to weigh and reconcile competing 
program objectives."93 Many housing authorities simply chose 
tenants based on date and time of application, feeling "that it 
would be wrong and arbitrary to endorse one local preference cat-
egory over another."9·1 
B. Current Income Targeting and Distribution 
As the preceding history reveals, the federal government grad-
ually shifted a greater share of rental assistance-through the 
three major programs-towards lower-income households. In 
1973, the precursor to Housing Choice Vouchers assisted those 
with incomes up to 80% of AMI and imposed no requirement that 
a share of this assistance be targeted towards lower-income 
households. This changed in 1975 with the introduction of a re-
quirement that 30% of assistance go to VLI households, those 
91. 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(o)(6)(A)(ii) (2012) ("Each system of preferences established pur-
suant to this subparagraph shall be based upon local housing needs and priorities, as de-
termined by the public housing agency using generally accepted data sources, including 
any information obtained pursuant to an opportunity for public comment as provided un-
der section 5A(f) and under the requirements applicable to the comprehensive housing af-
fordability strategy for the relevant jurisdiction."); see also DEBORAH J. DEVINE ET AL., U.S. 
DEI"T OF Hous. & URBAN DEV., THE USES OF DISCRETIONARY AUTHORITY IN THE TENAN'r-
BASED SECTION 8 PROGRAM: A BASELINE INVENTORY OF ISSUES, POLICY, AND PRACTICE 1 
(2000). The regulations governing local preferences for public housing selection are at 24 
C.F.R § 960.206. 
92. As Bruce Katz and Margery Austin Turner note in discussing ways to improve 
administration of the voucher program, "[L]ocal PHAs have considerable discretion over 
how the voucher program operates within their jurisdiction." BRUCE KATZ & MARGERY 
AUSTIN TURNER, BROOKINGS INST., INVEST BU'r HEFORM: STREAJVILINE ADMINISTRATION OF 
THE HOUSING CHOICE Voucmm PROGHAM 2 (2013); see supra note 89 and accompanying 
text. 
93. DEVINE ET AL., supra note 91, at ix. 
94. Id. at 7. 
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earning less than 50% of AMI.95 The shift of assistance towards 
lower-income households became more dramatic with the 
QHWRA in 1998. Currently 75% of new vouchers and project-
based Section 8 units in a given locale must go to ELI households, 
those with incomes under 30% of AMI.96 To further the goal of 
greater economic integration within public housing projects, only 
40% of public housing residents within a PHA must be ELI, a 
percentage that may be reduced if more than 75% of a PHA's 
vouchers are directed towards this segment of households. 97 In 
reality, the targeting requirements in the QHWRA did not radi-
cally alter the national profile of program recipients, as "[t]he na-
tion as a whole was already meeting the 75-percent ELI target 




HUD's annual Picture of Subsidized Housing reports data on 
the demographics of households receiving assistance through 
public housing, the Housing Choice Voucher program, and pro-
ject-based Section 8, as well as other HUD programs. 99 As the da-
ta in Table 1 indicates, over 90% of the assistance provided 
through these three programs nationwide goes to VLI households 
and between 72% and 76% of the households served by each pro-
gram are ELI. However, a study of administrative records from 
1997 to 2005 found that on the local level many PHAs were not 
yet meeting the targeting goals in the QHWRA. 100 Moreover, as 
Table 2 reveals, all three programs serve a smaller share of all 
95. See supra note 69. 
96. According to the Center for Budget and Policy Priorities, as of early 2013, 70% of 
assisted households were ELI. FEDERAL RENTAL ASSISTANCE, supra note 4, at 2. Current-
ly, at a minimum, to be eligible to receive a voucher a family must be a "low-income fami-
ly" (earning 80% or less of the AMI) that either (1) is "very low-income" (earning 50% or 
less of the AMI), (2) previously received public housing or Section 8 assistance, (3) was 
displaced from certain federal housing projects, (4) is a "nonpurchasing tenant of certain 
homeownership programs," or (5) meets eligibility criteria set by a public housing authori-
ty. LOUISE HUNT ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. & URilAN DEV., SUMl'vWlY OF THE QUALITY 
HOUSING & WORK RESPONSIBILITY ACT OF 1998, at 16 (1998), available at http://www. 
hud.gov/offices/pih/phr/about/titlev.pdf (summarizing 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(o)(4)). 
97. See HUNT ET AL., supra note 96, at 6. 
98. Dawkins, supra note 69, at 90. 
99. Picture of Subsidized Households 2013, supra note 37. 
100. See Dawkins, supra note 69, at 70, 90 (reviewing HUD "administrative records for 
all households receiving housing choice vouchers from 1997 through 2005 to determine if 
the income-targeting goals of QHWRA are being met at the national and local levels" and 
concluding that while most are in compliance with goals, nearly 40% are not). 
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individuals in the lowest income group, those earning under 
$5000, than those in most of the higher income brackets. 
Table 1: Income of Recipient Households
101 
Percentage of Percentage of 
Household Recipients Who Recipients Who Are 
Income, Are Very-Low In- Extremely-Low 
Percentage of come Income 
Local Median (< 50% of AMI) (<30% of AMI) 
Public Rous-
ing 25% 91% 72% 
Housing 
Choice 
Vouchers 22% 96% 76% 
Project-based 
Section 8 (New 
Construction/ 
Substantial 
Rehabilitation) 24% 96% 73% 
Table 2: Percentage of Households Receiving Assistance, 
by Household Income 
102 
Household Income $1- $5,000 - $10,000- $15,000- $20,000 
Bracket $4,999 $9,999 $14,999 $19,999 or more 
Public Housing 17% 32% 20% 12% 19% 
Housing Choice 
Vouchers 14% 30% 24% 14% 17% 
Project-based 
Section 8 (New 
Construction/ 
Substantial 
Rehabilitation) 11% 34% 29% 15% 11% 
C. Other Major Federal Housing Assistance Programs 
Part II focuses on the distributive fairness of the current allo-
cation of rental assistance resources among individuals eligible to 
receive public housing, Housing Choice Vouchers, and project-
based Section 8. Part III broadens this analysis to consider two 
other major programs through which the federal government pro-
vides housing assistance. Both programs are administered by the 
101. Picture of Subsidized Households 2013, supra note 37. 
102. Id. 
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IRS rather than HUD and-unlike the three HUD programs-
they do not target assistance towards ELI households. The 
LIHTC program is the largest federal program currently support-
ing the development of low-income rental housing. 10:i However, it 
primarily serves households with higher incomes than those in 
the HUD-administered programs. The HMID, the most substan-
tial source of federal support for housing is available to any 
homeowner but disproportionately assists higher income house-
holds.10·1 
Part III will argue in more detail that any attempt to achieve a 
more just distribution of the federal resources allocated towards 
the provision of housing must take both these programs into ac-
count and would demand substantial reform and reallocation. At 
the same time, there are practical reasons to focus first on the 
three HUD rental assistance programs: They share the specific 
purpose of providing direct rental assistance to low-income 
households, they have similar benefit structures and income-
targets, they are all spending programs administered by HUD, 
and, as discussed further below, reforming the HMID in particu-
lar is a contentious proposition. With these practical and political 
constraints in mind, the analysis in Part II looks first at the allo-
cation of rental assistance resources among individuals eligible 
for the three HUD program and proposes reforms that would cre-
ate a more equitable distribution of the scarce resources allocated 
to rental assistance. Part III then relaxes these constraints and 
takes a hard look at the reforms to the LIHTC and the HMID 
that a true commitment to the equitable distribution of all federal 
housing assistance would demand. 
1. The Low-Income Housing Tax Credit 
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 introduced the LIHTC, through 
which the IRS allocates tax credits to state housing agencies. 105 
These credits are then given to developers of affordable housing, 
who sell the credits to investors to raise capital for a project. 10" 
LU-ITC projects must either rent at least 20% of units to house-
103. Susannah Camic Tahk, The Tax War on Poverty, 56 ARIZ. L. REV. 791, 81l (2011). 
104. NEW Ymm CITY'S SUBSIDIZED HOUSING, supra note 77, at 42. 
105. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514 § 252, 100 Stat. 2085, 2189 (codified at 
26 u.s.c. § 42 (2006)). 
lOG. NEW YOHK CITY'S SUBSIDIZED HOUSING, supra note 77, at 42. 
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holds with incomes at or below 50% of AMI or 40% of units to 
households at or below 60% of AMI.1°7 Rents are set at no more 
than 30% of the target population's monthly income and must 
remain at affordable levels for a minimum of fifteen years. 108 Un-
like HUD's rental assistance programs, rents are not set at a per-
centage of the specific tenant's income and vary with income if a 
household receives assistance from another program: "As a result, 
the poorest households occupy relatively few LIHTC units."109 
LIHTC residents on average have higher incomes than house-
holds residing in the three programs discussed in the prior sec-
tion.110 
State and local governments exercise significant control over 
the· LIHTC program through annual Qualified Allocation Plans 
("QAPs"), m which establish the criteria that guide the allocation 
of LIHTC credits within a jurisdiction. However, the applicable 
federal statute requires that a QAP, in addition to considering lo-
cal conditions when determining housing priorities, must give 
preference to projects: (1) "serving the lowest income tenants"; (2) 
"obligated to serve qualified tenants for the longest periods"; and 
(3) "located in qualified census tracts ... and the development of 
which contributes to a concerted community revitalization 
plan."112 Qualified census tracts are low-income areas that either 
have poverty rates above 25% or where more than half of house-
holds have incomes below 60% of AMI. 11 :i Hence, rather than di-
recting assistance towards communities with higher opportunity 
107. Low Income Housing Tax Credit, 26 U.S.C. § 42(g)(l) (2006). 
108. OFFICE OF THE COJv!PTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, LOW-INCOME HOUSING TAX 
CREDITS: AFFORDABLE HOUSING INVESTMENT OPPORTUNITIES FOR BANKS 2-3 (2014). 
109. Olsen, Housing Programs for Low-Income Households, supra note 1, at 374. 'l'ax 
credits are often combined with other sources of financing to achieve rent levels low 
enough to serve the lowest-income households. Orlebeke, supra note 52, at 513. However, 
not all of the subsidies the LIHTC provides go towards a reduction in tenant rents. See 
Richard K. Green, Thoughts on Rental Housing and Rental Housing Assistance, 13 
CITYSCAI'E 39, 49 (2011) ("The fraction of the government subsidy that goes to renters de-
pends on the size of the discount a renter receives. This discount varies considerably from 
one market to the next."). 
110. See MEGAN BOLTON ET AL., NAT'L Low INCOME Hous. COAL., THE ALIGNMENT 
PROJECT: ALIGNING FEDERAL Low INCOME HOUSING PROGRAMS WITH HOUSING NEED 3 
(2014) (noting that ELI households are more typically served by HUD programs than by 
LIHTC and that LIHTC was not designed to serve these households). 
111. ED GRAMLICH, NAT'L. Low INCOME Hous. COAL., QUALIFIED ALLOCATION PLAN 3, 
available at http://nlihc.org/sites/default/files/2014AG-259.pdf 
112. 26 U.S.C. § 42(m)(l)(B) (2006). 
113. Id. §§ 42(m)(l)(C)(ii), (d)(5)(B)(ii)(I) (2006). 
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(better schools and employment prospects, safer neighborhoods, 
etc.), this preference for qualified census tracts directs funding 
towards units in less-advantaged communities. 114 
For the three HUD rental assistance programs the amount of 
subsidy allocated to a particular household can be determined by 
calculating the difference between 30% of the recipient's income 
and the rent for the unit they inhabit. 115 Given the structure of 
the LIHTC program-which instead sets rents at a percentage of 
a target population's income-it is more difficult to determine the 
precise amount of financial assistance allocated to a particular 
household. In addition, developers rely on a range of additional 
funding sources in order to develop properties. Individuals who 
live in LIHTC units often receive other forms of rental assis-
tance.116 Due to this combination of funding, "the costs and bene-
fits of the LIHTC program are harder to isolate" than they are for 
other affordable housing programs. 117 The practical challenges of 
determining the value of individual benefits, the distinct and lo-
cally-determined policy priorities of the LIHTC program, and the 
complex administrative structure of the LIHTC create challenges, 
for any attempt to link units in LIHTC developments with the 
three HUD programs into a single distributive scheme. 
2. The Home Mortgage Interest Deduction 
No discussion of the distribution of federal housing assistance 
can fail to acknowledge the largest source of government support 
for housing: the HMID. 118 Although it faces substantial criticism 
114. See generally Orfield, supra note 19, at 1750 (discussing tension between statutory 
preference for siting LIHTC development in low-income neighborhoods and requirements 
of the FHA). 
115. Housing Choice Vouchers Fact Sheet, U.S. DEP'T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., http:// 
portal.hud/hudportal/HUD?src=/program_offices/public_indianhousing/programs/hcv/abou 
t/fact_sheet#6 (last visited Apr. 3, 2015). 
116. FURMAN CTR. FOR REAL ESTATE & URBAN POLICY, WHAT CAN WE LEAHN ABOUT 
THE Low-INCOME HOUSING TAX Crmnrr PROGHAM UY LOOIGNG AT THE TENANTS'? 3 (2012) 
[hereinafter FUHMAN CTH., WHAT WE CAN LEARN]; Brian Coate, Closing the Gap: Soft 
Funding Options for LIFITC Projects, LANCASTER POLLAHD (Dec. 13, 2013), http://www. 
lancasterpollard.com/N ewsDetail/TCI-N ov-2013-Dec-2014-hsg-closing-the-ga p-for-LITHI C 
-projects. 
117. FUHMAN CTR., WHAT WE CAN LEAHN, supra note 116, at 7. 
118. MCCARTY ET AL., supra note 31, at 1 ("'!'he federal government's largest housing 
program, however, is arguably the mortgage interest deduction, which is not targeted to 
lower-income households, but is available to all homeowners who pay mortgage interest 
and itemize their deductions."). 
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from economists, the HMID has been described as "America's fa-
vorite itemized deduction"119 and the "most sacred tax break in 
the code."120 As currently structured the HMID operates as "an 
upside-down subsidy-the greater the need, the smaller the sub-
sidy."121 It does little to promote homeownership among lower-
income individuals and is substantially more generous to higher-
income individuals. The average tax savings for twenty-five- to 
thirty-five-year-old homeowners with more than $250,000 in in-
come is $7077.122 In comparison, homeowners with incomes of 
$40,000 to $75,000 save an average of $592 annually. 123 Those 
with incomes under $40,000 are able to reduce their tax bills by 
an average of only $208.124 
Given the size of the HMID, approximately 75% of federal 
housing-related expenditures-if we include both direct spending 
and subsidies through the tax code-is directed towards home-
ownership.125 More than half of all housing benefits go to house-
holds with incomes over $100,000.126 The Joint Committee on 
Taxation estimates that these households receive three-fourths of 
the combined value of the mortgage interest and property tax de-
ductions.127 In fact, the 20 million households with incomes of 
$20,000 or less receive a smaller share of federal housing expend-
itures than the five million households with incomes that exceed 
119. Hoberta F. Mann, The (Not So) Little House on the Prairie: The Hidden Costs of 
the Home Mortgage Interest Deduction, 32 Amz. ST. L.J. 1347, 1348 (2000). 
120. Dennis J. Ventry, ,Jr., The Accidental Deduction: A History and Critique of the Tax 
Subsidy for Mortgage Interest, 73 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 233, 234-35 (2010) (quoting 
JEFFimY H. BIRNBAUM & ALAN S. MURHAY, SHOWDOWN AT GUCCI GULCH: LAWMAKERS, 
LOBBYISTS, AND nrn UNLIKELY TRIUMPH OF TAX REFORM 246 (1987)). 
121. Mann, supra note 119, at 1361. 
122. James Poterba & Todd Sinai, Tax Expenditures for Owner-Occupied Housing: De-
ductions for Property Taxes and Mortgage Interest and the Exclusion of Imputed Rental 
Income, 98 AM. ECON. HEV. 84, 85, 89 (2008). 
123. Id. at 85. 
124. Id. 
125. BAIWAHA SARD & WILL FISCHEH, CTR. ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES, 
HENTER'S TAX CREDIT WOULD PROMOTE EQUITY AND ADVANCE BALANCED HOUSING POLICY 
l (2013), available at http://www.cbpp.org/files/7-13-12hous.pdf. 
126. Id.; see also Peter Dreier, The New Politics of Housing: How to Rebuild the Con-
stituency for a Progressive Federal Housing Policy, 63 J. Arv!. PLAN. Ass'N 5, 9 (1997) ("In 
fact, mortgage interest deductions for those earning over $100,000 are a sum greater than 
the entire HUD budget.") (quoting Iglesias, supra note 41, at 559). But see The Facts Ad: 
Defending the Mortgage Interest Deduction, NAT'L Ass'N HEALTOHS, http://www.scribd.com/ 
doc/78537 527 /The-Facts-Ad-Defending-the-Mortgage-Interest-Deduction (last visited Apr. 
3, 2015). 
127. FISCHER & SAHD, CHART BOOK, supra note 25. 
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$200,000. 128 In 2010, the average household in the lower-income 
group received an expenditure of $1471, compared with benefits 
valued at $7014 for households in the more affluent cohort. 129 Un-
like the rental assistance programs directed towards low-income 
households, tax expenditures130 for homeownership are an enti-
tlement; all who qualify receive this assistance. 
The HMID skews federal housing policy towards higher-income 
households. Writing over forty years ago, Stanley Surrey, a law 
professor and Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Tax Policy 
who introduced the term "tax expenditure," noted that the HMID 
diverted government spending away from addressing "the woeful-
ly inadequate supply of decent housing."m Although there were 
efforts to reform or eliminate the deduction following World War 
II, growing popular support pushed these off the table. 132 
As discussed in Part III, any attempt to reform federal housing 
policy to better accord with the most relevant conceptions of dis-
tributive justice demands radical reforms to the HMID. Part II 
first focuses more narrowly on the distribution of rental assis-
tance through the three primary HUD programs. As noted earli-
er, these programs share similar benefit structures and compara-
ble target populations. 133 They also serve 4.4 million households 
and deny assistance to three times as many households that sat-
isfy eligibility requirements. 131 As such, while moving towards a 
128. See id. (considering expenditures for mortgage interest and property tax deduc-
tions, Housing Choice Voucher, Section 8 Project-Based, Section 202, and Section 811 pro-
grams). 
129. Id. 
130. What constitutes a "tax expenditure" is the subject of much debate. In its simplest 
form, a tax expenditure represents a government spending program administered through 
the tax laws. See David A. Weisbach & Jacob Nussim, 'The Integration of 'Tax and Spend-
ing Programs, 113 YALE L.J. 955, 957 n.1 (2004); see also Victor Thuronyi, 'Tax Expendi-
tures: A Reassessment, 1988 DUKE L.J. 1155, 1158. Stanley Surrey, a law professor and 
Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Tax Policy, who introduced the term "tax expendi-
ture," argued in the late 1960s that federal housing tax policies, which gave the most sig-
nificant subsidies to the wealthiest taxpayers, created an inequitable and "upside-down 
result utterly at variance with usual expenditure policies." Ventry, supra note 120, at 264 
(quoting STANLEY S. SURREY, PATHWAYS TO TAX HEFORM: THE CONCEPT OF TAX 
EXPENDITURES 37 (1973)); see also Thuronyi, supra, at 1158 n.18. 
131. Ventry, supra note 120 at 264 (quoting SURREY, supra note 130, at 294). Surrey 
argued that that federal housing tax policies, which gave the most significant subsidies to 
the wealthiest taxpayers, created an inequitable and "upside-down result utterly at vari-
ance with usual expenditure policies." Id. at 264 (quoting SUHHEY, supra note 30, at 122). 
132. Id. at 252-74. 
133. See supra notes 33-37 and accompanying text. 
134. See supra note 36 and accompanying text. 
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more equitable distribution of the benefits provided through these 
three programs will not address all of the vertical and horizontal 
equity issues that the federal housing programs raise, it will af-
fect a substantial number of the most vulnerable households and 
help inform subsequent reflection on the roles of these other pro-
grams within the broader matrix of federal housing policy. 
D. Proposed Reforms of Existing Rental Assistance Programs 
Proposals to reform existing rental assistance programs fall in-
to two broad categories. Some suggest reducing the cost of hous-
ing provision or of program administration. Others recommend 
changes to the rules governing selection and eligibility of benefi-
ciaries. 
Reflecting the former approach, the high costs of providing 
supply-side, project-based assistance (both privately owned sub-
sidized housing and public housing) has led some to suggest a 
gradual phasing out of these forms of assistance in order to free 
up more money for arguably less-expensive vouchers. 135 Propo-
nents contend that this would allow the transformation of bene-
fits into an entitlement available to all who qualify. 136 Other pro-
posals seek to reduce administrative costs. Economist Edward 
Glaeser suggests that housing vouchers be administered as a tax 
credit for every eligible low-income family, based on the difference 
between their income and documented rent. 137 He contends that 
such an approach "could radically reduce administrative costs, 
enhance mobility and increase fairness." 138 Similarly, John 
Quigley proposed, as an ideal program design, transforming exist-
ing housing subsidies into an entitlement program that would op-
erate akin to food stamps or the EITC. 139 Quigley emphasized the 
135. See U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTA!lILI'rY OFFICE, FEDERAL HOUSING A'3SIS'l'ANCE, supra 
note 18, at 17 ("We estimate that, in the same general location, it costs more, on average, 
to provide one- and two-bedroom units under each of the production programs than it does 
under the voucher program."). 
136. OLSEN, LOW-INCOME HOUSING ASSISTANCE, supra note 12, at 5. 
137. Edward Glaeser, If HUD Must Close, Let's Keep its Best Programs, BLOOMllEHG 
Bus. (Apr. 23, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-04-23/if-hud-must-close-let-s-
keep-its-best-programs.html. 
138. Id. 
139. Quigley, Just Suppose, supra note 7, at 309. The EITC reduces benefits less slowly 
than income rises, so as to avoid creating a disincentive to work. See John J. Infranca, The 
Earned Income Tax Credit as an Incentive to Report: Engaging the Informal Economy 
Through Tax Policy, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 203, 211-17 (2008) (explaining program structure). 
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potential for such a program to reduce existing inequities but 
acknowledged that the path dependence of current program 
structure rendered such changes unlikely.140 
In contrast, the latter set of reform proposals focuses on deter-
minants of household eligibility and on more direct changes to the 
distribution of benefits among eligible households. Proposals to 
change the rules governing selection and eligibility include impos-
ing work preferences or requirements, 141 reducing the amount of 
benefits, 142 placing time-limits on the receipt of assistance, 143 or 
stepping up, over time, the percentage of a household's income 
that must be paid towards rent (thereby reducing the amount of 
the subsidy received). 144 Still others recommend lowering the in-
come level at which individuals qualify for assistance to a level at 
which it would be feasible to provide assistance to all eligible in-
dividuals. Along these lines, the Bipartisan Housing Commission 
140. Quigley, Just Suppose, supra note 7, at 309-12. In other work Quigley proposed a 
low-income rental housing subsidy administered by the IRS, noting that, in addition to 
potential savings in administration, "[u]sing the tax code to support low-income renters 
may ... further national goals of equity in the tax treatment of housing by the federal 
government." John M. Quigley, Rental Housing Assistance, 13 CITYSCAPE 147, 151 (2011) 
[hereinafter Quigley, Rental Housing Assistance]. 
141. BIPARTISAN MILLENNIAL Rous. COMM'N, supra note 42, at 5 (recommending "sev-
eral measures to move assisted families up and out of assisted housing units, over time, 
through a combination of work requirements and supportive services, enabling them to 
increase their incomes and freeing up the housing units for other, currently unassisted 
families"). 'l'he Commission expressly recommended adding work requirements modeled 
on welfare reform. Id. at 50-52. 
142. See Cutts & Olsen, supra note 10, at 238. Part II of this article returns to Cutts 
and Olsen's proposal in discussing equality of welfare. See infra notes 163-65 and accom-
panying text. 
143. Over the years various proposed voucher reform acts have included mandatory 
time limits. 'l'hese proposals have gained little traction. For example, Representative Gary 
Miller of California proposed an amendment to the Section 8 Voucher Reform Act of 2007 
that would have limited Section 8 assistance to 84 months, with an exception for elderly 
and disabled individuals and the possibility for a hardship exception. See KATHY CASTOR, 
PIWVIDING FOR CONSIDERATION OF THE BILL (fl.R. 1851) TO REFORM THE HOUSING CHOICE 
VOUCHER PROGRAM UNDER SECTION 8 OF THE UNITED STATES HOUSING AC'I' OF 1937, R.R. 
REP. No. 110-227, pt. 3, at 10-11 (2007) (Gary Miller, Sec. 6: Time Limitation on Assis-
tance). The amendment was not agreed to by voice vote. FINAL VOTE RESULTS FOR ROLL 
CALL 625, available at http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2007/roll625.xml; CLERK.HOUSE.GOV (Ju-
ly 12, 2007, 9:27 PM). Final Vote Results for Roll Call 625, available at http://clerk. 
house.gov/evs/2007/ roll625.xml. An effort in 2012 to impose a five year limit and a work 
requirement also failed. Section 8 Reform, Responsibility, and Accountability Act of 2012, 
R.R. 4145, 112th Cong.§§ 2, 3, 4, 5 (2012). 
144. BIPARTISAN MILLENNIAL HOUS. COMM'N, supra note 42, at 44 (suggesting as in-
centive for seeking employment, setting rents at 30% of income in first year of assistance 
and then gradually stepping up the share of income that goes towards rent in subsequent 
years). 
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of 2013 recommended shifting voucher assistance from continuing 
to serve households with incomes up to 80% of AMI towards serv-
ing only households with incomes that do not exceed 30% of AMI, 
but providing assistance to all eligible households with such in-
comes.115 
Despite their persistence, some of these ideas have encountered 
difficulties when put into practice. A number of housing agencies 
imposed time limits during the early stages of the Moving to 
Work Demonstration, with the goal of encouraging self-
sufficiency.116 The Moving to Work program provided housing 
agencies with flexibility in administering vouchers and other fed-
eral housing programs, enabling them to introduce new initia-
tives, particularly those aimed at employment and self-sufficiency 
or at increasing recipients' housing choices. 117 All of these PHAs 
"largely abandoned time limits" although some continued to con-
sider "mandatory minimum rents or subsidies that decreased 
over time, regardless of a household's income."148 
Despite this record, strong interest in time limits and other re-
forms remains. A recent Wall Street Journal article reported that 
President Obama's 2014 budget proposal included a call for "sub-
stantial expansion" of the Moving to Work Demonstration to al-
low PHAs to create additional incentives for residents to become 
financially independent, including by instituting time limits and 
work requirements. 149 While the leaders of some housing authori-
145. BIPARTISAN Hous. COMM'N OF 2013, at supra note 15 at 90. This proposal would 
cost an estimated $22.5 billion annually. Id. 
146. There is no conclusive evidence of the effect of Moving to Work on resident self-
sufficiency, due in part to the lack of consistent data collection. U.S. GOV'T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GA0-13-581, REN'l'AL HOUSING AsSISTANCE: HUD DA'l'A ON 
SELF-SUFFICIENCY PROGRAMS SHOULD BE IMPROVED 29 (2013) [hereinafter U.S. GOV'T 
ACCOUNTAnILITY OFFICE, RENTAL HOUSING AsSISTANCE]; see also APPLIED REAL ES'l'A'l'E 
ANALYSIS, INC. & THE URBAN INST., THE EXPERIENCES OF PUBLIC HOUSING AGENCIES 
THA'l' ESTABLISHED TIME LIMITS POLICIES UNDER THE MTW DEMONSTRATION; 27 (2007) 
(finding "limited evidence that exists suggests a mix of outcomes" for housing assistance 
recipients). 
147. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, HOUSING CHOICE VOUCHERS supra note 17, 
at 7. 
148. Id. at 38 (citing APPLIED REAL ESTATE ANALYSIS, INC. & THE URBAN INST., supra 
note 146). In addition, some have criticized these proposals on the grounds of a lack of 
evaluation of their effectiveness. See generally BARBARA SARD & WILL FISCHER, CTR. ON 
BUDGET & POL'Y PRIORITIES, BIPARTISAN LEGISLATION WOULD BUILD ON HOUSING 
VOUCIIER PROGRAM'S SUCCESS BUT WORTHWHILE REFORM BILL HOLDS RISKS FROM 
EXPANDED DEREGULATION AUTHORITY 2 (2007); MARGERY AUSTIN TURNER, URBAN INST., 
STHENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF THE HOUSING VOUCIIER PROGRAM (2003). 
149. Jennifer Levitz, Public Housing Agencies Push to Impose Time Limits, Worh Re-
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ties expressed support for such changes, asserting they would en-
able them to serve more people, housing advocates asserted the 
changes would force individuals to prematurely lose rental assis-
tance and simply cycle families back onto the waiting list. 150 
Abandoning time limits because they are perceived to have failed 
in encouraging self-sufficiency does not address the question of 
whether they might succeed in addressing inequities in benefit 
distribution. More broadly, although experiments with time lim-
its and other reforms may reveal their effects, by itself the study 
of program experience "cannot resolve the issues of basic fairness 
and balancing hardships that are raised by such proposals."151 
Part II explores these questions of basic fairness in depth. 
II. EXAMINING HOUSING ASSISTANCE IN LIGHT OF DIFFERENT 
THEORIES OF DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE 
Although federal low-income rental housing policy is often dis-
missed as inequitable, there has been no sustained analysis of 
exactly how existing policy violates specific understandings of dis-
tributive justice. This analysis begins by framing the scope of the 
inquiry that follows, including a discussion of whose interests 
should be considered when assessing the distribution of housing 
assistance. There has been much debate in the philosophical lit-
erature regarding the specific element of an individual's condition 
that should be the focus of concern for those who seek greater 
equality. 152 Part II examines arguments in favor of distribution on 
the basis of equality of welfare, desert, and equality of resources, 
as well as the Rawlsian difference principle, which favors a dis-
tribution that prioritizes not equality but rather the maximum 
welfare of the worst off individual. It also considers the capability 
quirements for Aid Recipients, WALL ST. J. (May 6, 2013), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB 
10001424127887323820304578410382522144560 (noting five-year time limit for housing 
vouchers in Tacoma, Washington and proposed time limits in San Mateo, California, San 
Antonio, and Alaska). 
150. Id. 
151. ROD SOLOMON, BROOKINGS INST. METRO. POLICY PROGRAM, PUBLIC HOUSING 
REFORM AND VOUCHER SUCCESS: PROGRESS AND CHALLENGES 48 (2005). 
152. See, e.g., Richard J. Arneson, Opportunity for Welfare, Priority, and Public Policy, 
in GLOBALIZATION, CULTURE, AND THE LIMITS OF THE MARKET: ESSAYS IN ECONOMICS AND 
PHILOSOPHY 177, 181 (Steven Cullenberg & Prasanta K. Pattanaik eds., 2004) ("The major 
divide in the equality-of-what debate is resources versus welfare. Although deep, the di-
vide is unclear."); Norman Daniels, Equality of What: Welfare, Resources, or Capabilities?, 
50 PHIL. & PHENOMENOLOGICAL RES. 273, 277 (1990); Amartya Sen, Equality of What?, in 
THE TANNER LECTURE ON HUMAN V ALOES 197 (1980) [hereinafter Sen, Equality of What?]. 
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approach, which does not provide a complete theory of distribu-
tive justice, but instead calls for a substantive reframing of the 
information bases used to evaluate specific policies. 153 
In the course of presenting each of these frameworks, this part 
discusses how well existing rental assistance policy advances a 
given theoretical approach and evaluates how each theory might 
inform potential reform. It also considers the extent to which each 
theory's conception of the proper aim of distributive justice aligns 
with the goals and purposes of federal rental assistance pro-
grams, as revealed in Part I, and the potential for practical re-
forms to existing programs that would implement these theoreti-
cal commitments. The discussion that follows inevitably entails 
certain simplifications of the theories under discussion, which 
will be made clear as necessary. 
A Framing the Analysis 
There are three caveats to note at the outset. First, as current-
ly structured, federal housing policy clearly fails to satisfy any 
plausible theory of distributive justice. This is true even if we fo-
cus solely upon distribution among eligible beneficiaries of rental 
assistance, but is, as noted, even more apparent if we look more 
broadly at the federal government's support for housing through 
the mortgage interest deduction and other housing policies. The 
inequitable distribution of rental assistance specifically is partly 
due to the myriad policy goals this assistance is enlisted to 
serve-which include many worthy, but expensive, objectives. 
Nonetheless, there are specific ways in which federal rental assis-
tance policy shows concern for some of the normative principles 
discussed in this part. Accordingly, what follows highlights these 
instances and uses them as starting points to think more system-
ically about how rental assistance policy and housing assistance 
policy more generally can be reformed to better accord with dis-
tributive justice concerns. 
Second, there is an undeniable challenge in trying to translate 
theories of justice into specific policy recommendations. This may 
be because these theories often deem the proper subject of justice 
to be a more holistic and systemic consideration of the broad 
153. See infra notes 229-98 and accompanying text. 
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structures of society. 154 Theories may simply fail to provide prin-
ciples sufficiently specific to indicate particular policies155 or they 
may demand perfect information regarding a law's effects on ra-
ther far-flung issues and people. 156 Most decisionmakers will be 
unable to ascertain a law's impact on so broad of scale, or will be 
constrained with regards to which laws and institutions they ex-
ercise control over. Despite these concerns, evaluating federal 
housing policy in light of theories of distributive justice will help 
clarify the choices that are already being made and how more eq-
uitable choices can be made in the future-even if the ideal dis-
tribution remains elusive. At the very least a clearer articulation 
of how housing policy accounts for distributive concerns, even if 
imperfectly, should strengthen the political legitimacy of existing 
programs. 
'rhird, the varying goals ascribed to federal rental assistance 
suggest a range of ways to define the beneficiaries of this assis-
tance. Goals such as eliminating concentrations of poverty, in-
creasing access to opportunity, encouraging integration, and fur-
thering community development, 157 broaden the scope of whose 
154. Waldron, supra note 29, at 803 (ascribing this view to Rawls). In framing his topic 
of social justice Rawls states that "the primary subject of justice is the basic structure of 
society, or more exactly, the way in which the major social institutions distribute funda-
mental rights and duties and determine the division of advantages from social coopera-
tion." JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 7 (1971). In Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, 
Rawls notes that for purposes of his theory, distributive justice refers to the basic struc-
ture of "society as a fair system of social cooperation over time." JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS 
FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT 50 (2001). He contrasts this with the subject of this article's 
inquiry, which he frames as "allocative justice"-the "problem of how a given bundle of 
commodities is to be distributed." Id.; see also Vicki Been, What's Fairness Got to Do with 
It?: Environmental Justice and the Siting of Locally Undesirable Land Uses, 78 CORNELL 
L. REV. 1001, 1048 (1993) (noting that Rawls's theory of justice "addresses the design of 
fair institutional structures, not the fairness of individual distributional choices"). 
155. Waldron, supra note 29, at 803. ("In Rawls's theory and in other theories of justice 
there is considerable distance between the models that the theory uses and the principles 
that it generates, on the one hand, and particular policy recommendations, on the other."). 
156. Waldron distinguishes socioeconomic rights-which focus on narrow areas of poli-
cy-from justice, declaring that 
what the Rawlsian theory generates, regarding what is required in the way of 
(say) education will emerge from a process in which both the competition be-
tween education and other demands on resources and the relation between 
the impact of educational arrangements and the impact of other arrange-
ments on people's life prospects have been properly considered together. 
Id. at 803-04. 
157. See BIPARTISAN ROUS. COMM'N OF 2013, supra note 15, at 11, 52 ("While rental 
assistance is usually categorized as a social program designed to help meet the basic needs 
of low-income families, it is also a large-scale investment in the physical infrastructure of 
our communities. By closing the gap between the cost of owning and operating decent 
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interests must be considered when analyzing the distributive im-
pact of a particular housing policy. 158 These goals partly frame 
rental assistance as a public good and not simply an individual 
benefit. 159 On this account the potential beneficiaries could, for 
example, include all individuals within a certain distance of as-
sisted housing. This perspective, it must be conceded, differs from 
the typical perception of assisted housing units-which communi-
ties often fight to exclude. 160 Yet some recent research indicates 
that subsidized housing can positively affect neighboring property 
values (although this effect may be more pronounced in neigh-
borhoods with lower property values overall). 161 Similarly, if inte-
gration is truly a public good then those benefited will include not 
only those coming into a community and making it more inte-
grated, but also those already living in the community. Consider-
ing this broader range of potential beneficiaries adds substantial 
complexity to an analysis of the fairness of any existing or pro-
posed distribution. Providing a fuller account of rental assistance 
as a public good and of how the interests of "indirect beneficiar-
ies" of this assistance might be weighed is beyond the scope of 
this article. As such, what follows focuses on the direct beneficiar-
ies of rental assistance: the individuals the distribution of this 
limited resource most affects. Part III argues that the proposed 
housing resource bundle approach not only best provides for the 
most equitable distribution among direct recipients, but also bet-
ter serves many of the broader concerns identified. 
housing and the rent that extremely low-income tenants can afford to pay, rental assis-
tance programs sustain a valuable component of our physical infrastructure that other-
wise would be jeopardized."). 
158. Even more broadly, the simple goal of providing decent housing to individual 
households can be said to benefit individuals beyond the direct recipients of housing. If 
this housing furthers self-sufficiency it should benefit the broader society by reducing de-
mands on public funds or by strengthen the overall economy by means of higher rates of 
employment. 
159. Along these lines, New Jersey case law recognizes public housing as a use that 
"inherently serves the public good" so as to satisfy the showing of a "special reason" re-
quired to obtain a use variance. Saddle Brook Realty v. Twp. of Saddle Brook Zoning Bd. 
of Adjustment, 906 A.2d 454, 460 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2006). 
160. See, e.g., Joseph Berger, An Affordable Housing Project Faces Opposition in 
Wealthy Chappaqua, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2014, at A18. 
161. See, e.g., Ingrid Gould Ellen et al., Does Federally Subsidized Rental Housing De-
press Neighborhood Property Values?, 26 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGM'I'. 257, 257-58 (2007) 
(finding that federally subsidized housing does not typically reduce neighboring property 
values and in some instances increases property values); Amy Ellen Schwartz et al., The 
External Effects of Place-Based Subsidized Housing, 36 REGIONAL SCI. & URB. ECON. 679, 
680 (2006). 
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B. Theories of Justice 
1. Equality of Welfare 
Under a distributive theory focused on equality of welfare 
"goods are distributed equally among a group of persons to the 
degree that the distribution brings it about that each person en-
joys the same welfare."rn2 Defining "welfare" can prove conten-
tious. It may be understood objectively, such as the fulfillment of 
certain fundamental needs. Or it may be understood subjectively, 
based on the satisfaction of individual preferences. 163 A subjective 
understanding can lead to challenges of accounting for expensive 
tastes and preferences, the satisfaction of which might demand 
substantially more resources. 161 In an article critiquing the equali-
ty of welfare approach, Ronald Dworkin acknowledges its "imme-
diate appeal," which "lies in the idea that welfare is what really 
matters to people, as distinct from money and goods, which mat-
ter to them only instrumentally, so far as they are useful in pro-
ducing welfare." 165 
In a limited sense the general structure of the primary forms of 
rental assistance (public housing and both forms of Section 8) re-
flect some concern with equality of welfare, at least among those 
fortunate enough to receive assistance. The programs are de-
signed to provide recipients with housing that meets certain min-
imum standards of quality but that does so without providing 
equal resources (in terms of the amount of financial assistance) to 
individual recipients. More specifically, rental assistance re-
sources are allocated among recipients to provide each recipient 
162. Hichard J. Arneson, Equality and Equal Opportunity for Welfare, 56 PHIL. STUD. 
77, 82 (1989) [hereinafter Arneson, Equality and Equal Opportunity]; see also Dworkin, 
Equality of Welfare, supra note 29, at 186 (stating that equality of welfare "holds that a 
distributional scheme treats people as equals when it distributes or transfers resources 
among them until no further transfer would leave them more equal in welfare"). 
163. See Arneson, Equality and Equal Opportunity, supra note 162, at 82; ("I take wel-
fare to be preference satisfaction."); Daniels, supra note 152, at 277. 
164. See Dworkin, Equality of Welfare, supra note 29, at 189. Some egalitarian theo-
rists argue not for equality of welfare itself, but rather in favor of "equal opportunity for 
welfare," a perspective this article returns. See Arneson, Equality and Equal Opportunity, 
supra note 162, at 84-87. 
165. Dworkin, Equality of Welfare, supra note 29, at 207. Earlier in the same text, 
Dworkin observes that "the concept of welfare was invented or at least adopted by econo-
mists precisely to describe what is fundamental in life rather than what is merely instru-
mental. It was adopted, in fact, to provide a metric for assigning a proper value to re-
sources: resources are valuable so far as they produce welfare." Id. at 188. 
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with housing at (or above) a specified standard and at a cost to 
the recipient of no more than 30% of income. 166 The payment 
standard for a program can be increased in a given locale with 
high housing costs, ostensibly to ensure that the assistance pro-
vided is sufficient to attain this minimum standard of housing 
quality. 167 Rental assistance programs are designed to operate, as 
David Super notes, as "functional entitlements."168 They adjust, 
based on a recipient's income and local rents, to guarantee that 
the assistance provided "will meet some qualitatively definable 
need of its beneficiaries."169 
This is, of course, a simplified understanding of equality of wel-
fare as it assumes a uniform and apersonal conception of wel-
fare-provision of housing units of basically equal (or at least 
some minimum) quality-without consideration of the individual 
preferences and tastes (potentially refined and expensive) that af-
fect actual welfare. Nonetheless, if we consider what has histori-
cally been emphasized as one of, if not the, primary goals of hous-
ing assistance policy-providing "a decent home and a suitable 
living environment for every American family" 110-there is an im-
plicit concern, at least within the set of direct recipients of assis-
tance, with equality of welfare insofar as an assumed preference 
for adequate housing is an important component of welfare and a 
fundamental need. 111 In addition, historic changes in federal rent-
al assistance policy have likely had a positive effect on the subjec-
tive welfare of recipients. The shift towards demand-side subsi-
dies, in the form of vouchers, enable a voucher recipient to better 
express their preferences (albeit constrained by the pool of avail-
able and eligible units and of landlords willing to accept a vouch-
er) through their choice of a particular unit and a particular lo-
cale versus an individual receiving a specific public housing 
unit. 112 
166. See supra notes 82-83 and accompanying text. 
167. Id. 
168. David A. Super, The Political Economy of Entitlement, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 633, 
657 n.109 (2004). 
169. Id. at 655. 
170. Housing Act of 1949, Pub. L. No. 81-171, 63 Stat. 413 (1949) (codified as amended 
at 42 U.S.C. § 1441a (2012)); see also BIPARTISAN Hous. COMM'N OF 2013, supra note 15, at 
85-88; BIPAHTISAN MILLENNIAL Hous. COMM'N, supra note 42, at 22-23. 
171. This depends upon reading "suitable living environment" to refer to conditions 
within a housing unit, rather than the neighborhood environment. 
172. See Ellickson, supra note 1, at 999 (noting that vouchers are likely to be superior 
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Of course, our focus is not equality only among the one in four 
eligible individuals who receive assistance. Once we take a step 
back from current recipients, we see a substantial failure to 
achieve equality of welfare-whether measured objectively or 
subjectively-among all those eligible for rental assistance (and 
an even more glaring failure if we consider the distribution of all 
forms of housing assistance). One can debate whether the scarcity 
of resources for rental assistance specifically is simply due to a 
lack of political will. in However, if one accepts as fixed the total 
resources allocated towards rental assistance, a deeper commit-
ment to equality of welfare-understood in a simplified fashion as 
providing all eligible households with housing of similar quality 
at the cost of an equal percentage of their income-would demand 
a shift towards substantially smaller sums of assistance for indi-
vidual recipients. 
There have been suggestions of reform along these lines in the 
economics and policy literature. Amy Cutts and Edgar Olsen sug-
gest reducing HUD's FMRs, which would substantially lower the 
maximum subsidy available, allowing for the same budget "to 
serve many additional families." 171 Their analysis finds that the 
minimum rent necessary to obtain a housing unit that meets pro-
gram standards regarding space and condition is substantially 
less than the FMR in eleven cities studied. 175 Although they 
acknowledge that some families may choose not to participate in 
the program if the subsidy is reduced, Cutts and Olsen contend 
that reducing the FMR will serve more families and that "a high-
er fraction of the budget will go to the poorest families."176 
Another option would be to impose stringent time limits. A life-
time limit on the number of years an individual can receive assis-
tance, without more, would eventually achieve equality of welfare 
among those eligible by simply shrinking the pool of eligible 
to project-based assistance "in placing assisted tenants in dwellings whose locations and 
designs suit their preferences"). 
173. See Grigsby & Bourassa, supra note 7, at 812 (contending that failure to trans-
form housing assistance over the prior three decades into an entitlement "is less a reflec-
tion of fiscal constraints than of a lack of political interest."). 
17 4. Cutts & Olsen, supra note 10, at 228. 
175. Id. at 222, 224-75 tbl.2. 
176. Id. at 234. Along these lines, France provides a less-generous form of housing as-
sistance as an entitlement. Ellickson, supra note 1, at 987 (citing Anne Laferrere & David 
Le Blanc, Housing Policy: Low-Income Households in France, in A COMPANION TO URBAN 
ECONOMICS 159, 165 (Hichard J. Arnott & Daniel P. McMillen eds., 2006)). 
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households until the number remaining can all receive assis-
tance. But this hardly seems a triumph of distributive justice, 
particularly if those individuals' housing needs remain unmet. 
If distribution is patterned on some objective measure of wel-
fare-such as "a decent home and a suitable living environ-
ment"177-it furthers only one of the goals of federal rental assis-
tance. To move away from an objective understanding of equality 
of welfare, and more seriously consider individual subjective pref-
erences, would demand substantial administrative costs in order 
to evaluate the welfare of individual recipients. Such a task-to 
the extent it is even possible-is beyond the expertise of those 
who administer housing programs. 178 Accordingly, even if equality 
of welfare is a proper concern of distributive justice in an ideal 
state, it does not provide practical guidance for distributing re-
sources through the hands of a limited government agency. 
2. Desert-Based Theories 
Desert-based principles of distributive justice allocate re-
sources based upon a particular basis of desert. Potential bases 
may include the effort expended by individuals in some particular 
activity or the value of the contribution an individual's work ac-
tivity makes to society. 179 The determination of what constitutes a 
legitimate desert-basis typically depends upon a prior considera-
tion of "external goals and values-goals and values which cannot 
be found by an examination of the concept of desert itself."18° Con-
temporary desert-principles emphasize the importance of goals 
such as raising the collective standard of living, or "social prod-
uct," and accordingly, "only activity directed at raising the social 
177. Housing Act of 1949, Pub. L. No. 81-171, 63 Stat. 413 (1949) (codified as amended 
at 42 U.S.C. § 1441a (2012)). 
178. Comparisons of individual welfare will, as Dworkin notes, often simply be inde-
terminate. See Dworkin, Equality of Welfare, supra note 29, at 191. 
179. These approaches to distribution have a lineage that goes back to Aristotle, but 
more directly descend from John Locke's theory of property. JEREMY WALDRON, THE RIGHT 
TO PRIVATE PHOPERTY 201-02 (1990); see also Julian Lamont & Christi Favor, Distributive 
Justice, in STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OI•' PHIL. (Edward N. Zalta ed., 2013), available at http:// 
plato .stanford.edu/ archives/ spr2013/ entries/justice-distributive/. 
180. Julian Lamont, The Concept of Desert in Distributive Justice, 44 PHIL. Q. 45, 4 7 
(1994). 
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product will serve as a basis for deserving income."181 On this ac-
count the valuing of higher living standards motivates the deci-
sion to reward productive activity. 182 
Engagement in paid employment is a standard example of a so-
cially productive activity. With this as a desert-basis we might 
invoke the principle of desert to inform the allocation of rental as-
sistance in two broad fashions: through a preference for house-
holds that simply satisfy, without regard to the intensity of their 
activity, the desert principle183 or through a change to the benefit 
structure that imposes time limits but provides an exception for 
those engaged in work or who satisfy some other metric of de-
sert.18·1 With regards to the former, PHAs are expressly allowed to 
implement a preference for working families when administering 
their waiting list for both Public Housing and Housing Choice 
Voucher programs. 185 However, emblematic of the programmatic 
181. Lamont & Favor, supra note 179. 
182. As Julian Lamont frames it, if an increase in the social product is what is valued, 
then "it is because people have contributed to society's happiness that they deserve X. The 
fact that giving them X may also have the effect of maximizing happiness in the long run 
does not enter into the justification." Lamont, supra note 180, at 61-62. To frame the mat-
ter in the inverse, as Lamont notes, would be to adopt a utilitarian analysis focused on 
social utility. Id. at 60 ("[T]o say 'S deserves X because giving it to him would be in the 
public interest' is simply to misuse the word 'deserves."') (quoting JoEJ, FmNBERG, DOING 
AND DESimVING 81 (1970)). 
18:3. Somewhat along these lines, Alan Zaitchik provides a defense of effort as a basis 
for desert in On Deserving to Deserve. He first distinguishes what he terms "competitive 
cases" and "noncompetitive cases." Alan Zaitchik, On Deserving to Deserve, 6 PHIL & Pun. 
AFF. :370, :379 (1977). In the case of the latter, the amount of a good that one person re-
ceives will not adversely affect the amount that anyone else can receive. Given an unlim-
ited supply of the good an individual who satisfies some minimal and standard condition 
would automatically deserve the good. Id. at 381. Zaitchik proposes an egalitarian desert-
for-effort theory that, rather than award shares according to relative desert, as an Aristo-
telian might, would instead give an equal share to everyone who simply satisfies the min-
imal conditions necessary to deserve a share: "[A]nyone who has made an effort deserves 
to be a participant in the distributive game and is worthy of having his needs met." Id. at 
385. However, given that housing assistance is not, as currently funded, a good in unlim-
ited supply, this approach would not be workable. 
184. In fact, a significant share of housing assistance beneficiaries is employed. Sixty-
six percent of non-elderly and non-disabled HCV households either worked in 2010 or had 
worked recently. BAHBAHA SAHD & THYHIA ALVAHEZ-SANCHEZ, CTH. ON BUDGET & POLICY 
PHIOHITIES, LAHGE M,\,JORITY OF HOUSING VOUCHER RECIPIENTS WORK, Alm ELDEHLY, OR 
HAVE DISAI3ILIT!ES: HIGHER HOUSING COSTS DRIVE LONGER STAYS FOR WOHKING FAMILIES 
5-6 (2011), available at http://www.cbpp.org/files/12-2-llhous.pdf. An additional 11% of 
households received assistance through a state TANF program that imposes work re-
quirements on most adult recipients. Id. at 6. As of 2010, "88 percent of all voucher house-
holds were elderly, disabled, working (or recently worked), or likely to be subject to a work 
requirement under the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families ('l'ANF) program." Id. at 
1. 
185. U.S. DEP"l' OF Hous. & URBAN DEV., Pun. & IND!. Ho us., NOTICE PIH 2011-33, USE 
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tensions outlined in Part I, any preference policy must be pursued 
in a manner that does not increase minority concentration, and a 
PHA must simultaneously continue to target assistance towards 
ELI households and promote poverty deconcentration and income 
mixing in public housing. 186 The second possibility would be to 
impose time limits on the receipt of benefits, coupled with an ex-
ception that allows households with earned income to receive 
benefits indefinitely, but subject to paying a higher percentage of 
their earned income towards rent. Along these lines, at least one 
local agency participating in the Moving to Work Program insti-
tuted a rent structure that gradually increases the percentage of 
household income paid towards rent, with the stated goal of pro-
moting self-sufficiency among recipients. 187 Reforming the struc-
ture of rental assistance to promote self-sufficiency is different, 
however, from invoking a desert principle to reward work. 188 
However, the same policy may serve as both a reward for desert 
and an incentive for future behavior. 189 
A study by HUD of how PHAs used their discretion to set pref-
erences for receipt of voucher benefits revealed that some concep-
tion of desert informed the preferences that certain PHAs 
choice. 190 While some PHAs imposed preferences for working indi-
OF WORK PREFERENCES AS A PUBLIC HOUSING WAITING LIST MANAGEMENT TOOL AND AS A 
LEASE PROVISION FOR CERTAIN PUBLIC HOUSING BUILDINGS 1-2 (2011) [hereinafter USE 
OF Worm PREFERENCES]. A working family preference must also be given to a family "if 
the head and spouse or sole member is age 62 or older, or is a person with disabilities." Id. 
(citing 24 C.F.R. § 960.206(b)(2) (2014)). 
186. USE OF WORK PHEFERENCES, supra note 185, at 4-5. Moreover, preferences must 
be set aside if they have an impermissible fair housing effect, such as by perpetuating seg-
regated housing patterns or act as a barrier to affirmatively furthering fair housing. See 
Davis v. New York City Hous. Auth., 278 F.3d 64, 71 (2d Cir. 2002) (evaluating impact of 
preference on existing requirements for desegregation of developments); Comer v. Cisne-
ros, 37 F.3d 775, 795 (2d Cir. 1994) (same); Langlois v. Abington Rous. Auth., 234 F. Supp. 
2d 33, 40 (D. Mass. 2002) (same). 
187. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, HOUSING CHOICE VOUCHEHS, supra note 17, 
at 31. In years 1 and 2, households paid 27% of their gross income towards rent, in years 3 
and 4, they paid the greater of 29% of income or $100, and in subsequent years they paid 
the greater of 31 % of income or $200. Id. According to the GAO, as a result of this struc-
ture "households receive more subsidy in the first 2 years, but pay more rent over time 
than under current rent structure." Id. 
188. Lamont & Favor, supra note 179. ("Payments designed to give people incentives 
are a form of entitlement particularly worth distinguishing from desert-payments as they 
are commonly confused."). 
189. Id. 
190. DEVINE ET AL., supra note 91, at 8; see also Josh Leopold, 'The Housing Needs of 
Rental Assistance Applicants, 14 CITYSCAPE 275, 277 (2012) (noting that most common 
preferences were for employed applicants, local residents or workers, involuntarily dis-
placed individuals, and domestic violence victims). 
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viduals in order to "support ... upward mobility," this was often 
coupled with a preference for individuals who are already work-
ing or, as framed by one PHA, for "help[ing] people who help 
themselves."191 
Although using desert as a distributive basis accords with the 
stated motivations for the preferences that certain PHAs estab-
lished, it does not provide a suitable basis for the allocation of 
rental assistance benefits. A few objections arise. First, measur-
ing desert can prove difficult even if there is broad agreement on 
the desert basis. If the desert-basis is effort expended in work, an 
individual's earnings, which may provide the easiest metric, are 
not necessarily a perfect measure of desert. Earnings may meas-
ure productivity, but to measure effort one would at least need to 
consider the number of hours worked, if not also some measure of 
how demanding the work itself is. 192 Even if hours of work is 
deemed a worthy proxy, one might ask whether commuting 
hours-typically a larger share of the day for lower-waged work-
ers forced to live in less expensive locales-should be added or 
whether hours should be deducted for jobs with ample idle time. 
Second, the distinction between productivity and effort gets at a 
key issue in the philosophical literature on desert, the question of 
the voluntariness of any particular desert-basis. Proponents of 
other theories of distributive justice reject desert principles on the 
grounds that these approaches simply provide for distribution 
based on the arbitrary allocation of natural assets. John Rawls, 
for example, contended that because "no one deserves his place in 
the distribution of native endowments," nor the superior charac-
ter that drives him to cultivate these abilities, individuals have 
no valid claim to a greater share of benefits on the basis of de-
sert.193 For these and other reasons, while desert plays an im-
portant part in people's commonsense attitudes towards public 
191. See DEVINE ET AL., supra note 91, at 8-9 ("The philosophy of one small PHA in the 
West is that preferences should be designed to help people who help themselves, and it is 
for this reason that they maintain a preference for those who are working."). 
192. See Lamont, supra note 180, at 57. 
193. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE supra note 154, at 104. Rawls does acknowledge 
that one may be entitled to certain things-in order to further expectations that will elicit 
one's efforts, given the existing rules of an established social scheme. Id. at 103. This does 
not, however, imply that one deserves these things in the first place. MICHAEL J. SANDEL, 
LIBEHALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE 71 (2d ed. 1998); see also id. at 88 ("For Rawls, the 
principles of justice aim neither at rewarding virtue nor at giving people what they de-
serve, but instead at calling forth the resources and talents necessary to serve the common 
interest."). 
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policy and the stated motivations for certain proposed reforms to 
housing policy,rn4 the concept has little importance in contempo-
rary liberal theory. 195 
More practical objections also exist. Desert-based principles al-
so fail to provide a complete theory for determining the distribu-
tion of assistance. 19n Although they might provide a means for al-
locating benefits among able-bodied working adults, they do not 
offer a clear principle for allocation among children, elderly, and 
disabled individuals, three groups that comprise a substantial 
share of rental assistance beneficiaries. 197 In addition, unlike the 
EITC, which rewards earned income by providing individuals 
with a refundable credit when they file their tax returns at the 
end of the year, 198 the distribution of rental assistance cannot eas-
ily respond to changes in a desert-basis such as work. 199 Housing 
cannot simply be granted and taken away, like a tax credit, in re-
sponse to past behavior. In sum, desert should not play the pri-
mary role in determining the proper distribution of rental assis-
tance. 
3. Equality of Resources 
A third approach to distributive justice focuses on the sum of 
resources expended on each individual rather than some meas-
ure, such as welfare, of the outcome of that allocation. A distribu-
tive theory that endorses equality of resources seeks to establish 
equality by distributing or transferring resources "so that no fur-
ther transfer would leave [people's] shares of the total resources 
194. Samuel Scheffler, Responsibility, Reactive Attitudes, and Liberalism in Philosophy 
and Politics, 21 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 299, 301 (1992). 
195. Samuel Scheffler, Justice and Desert in Liberal Theory, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 965, 
965-66 (2000). 
196. Lamont & Favor, supra note 179. 
197. See id.; FEDERAL RENTAL ASSISTANCE, supra note 4, at 1-2 (finding that people 
who are elderly, disabled, or members of households with children received roughly 90% of 
federal rental assistance benefits). 
198. See IRS, Earned Income Tax Credit, Questions and Answers, http://www.irs.gov/ 
Individuals/EITC,-Earned-Income-Tax-Credit,-Questions-and-Answers (last visited Apr. 3, 
2015) (describing the EITC). 
199. See U.S. DEP'T OF Rous. & URBAN DEV., HUD HANDBOOK 4350.3: OCCUPANCY 
REQUIREMENTS OF SUBSIDIZED MUL'rIFAMILY HOUSING PROGRAMS 7-1, 7-3 (2013), availa-
ble at http://www.hud.gov/offices/adm/hudclips/handbooks/hsgh/4350.3/ 43503c7HSGH.pdf 
(describing how HUD recipients are subject to an annual recertification process in order to 
continue receiving their rental assistance benefits). 
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more equal."200 One strength of this approach is that "[u]nder 
equality of resources ... people decide what sorts of lives to pur-
sue against a background of information about the actual cost 
their choices impose on other people and hence on the total stock 
of resources that may fairly be used by them."201 Its primary ex-
ponent, Ronald Dworkin, emphasized the compatibility of equali-
ty of resources with private ambition: "If government succeeds in 
securing for each citizen a genuinely equal share of resources to 
use as he wishes in making his life successful according to his 
lights, then once again his choices will give effect to rather than 
corrupt what government has done."202 Using equality of resources 
as a norm for distributing rental assistance would provide greater 
personal choice for the recipients of assistance, enabling them to 
set their own priorities for how best to use rental assistance, but 
leaving them responsible for the outcomes of those choices. 
There is one important proviso. On Dworkin's account "the re-
sources devoted to each person's life should be equal," assuming, 
however, "that people enter the market on equal terms."203 An in-
dividual "born with a serious handicap" is said to possess fewer 
resources than others, which-in pursuit of equality of re-
sources-justifies compensation to remedy this unfairness.201 In 
addition, although the subsequent distribution of resources can 
be sensitive to individual ambition, the distribution of resources 
subsequent to initial allocation cannot be affected by individual 
endowments or "differences in ability of the sort that produce in-
come differences in a laissez-faire economy among people with the 
same ambitions."205 To this end, Dworkin advocates "a scheme of 
redistribution . . . that will neutralize the effects of differential 
talents, yet preserve the consequences of one person choosing an 
occupation, in response to his sense of what he wants to do with 
his life, that is more expensive for the community than the choice 
200. Dworkin, Equality of Welfare, supra note 29, at 186. 
201. Ronald Dworkin, What is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources, 10 PHIL. & Pun. 
AFF. 283, 288 (1981) [hereinafter Dworkin, Equality of Resources]. 
202. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 299 (1986); see also Dworkin, Equality of Re-
sources, supra note 201, at 311 (arguing that distribution of resources at given moment 
must be allowed to "reflect the cost or benefit to others of the choices people make so that, 
for example, those who choose to invest rather than consume, or to consume less expen-
sively rather than more, or to work in more rather than less profitable ways, must be 
permitted to retain the gains that flow from these decisions"). 
203. Dworkin, Equality of Resources, supra note 201, at 289. 
204. Id. at 302. 
205. Id. at 311. 
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another makes."206 Perfectly disaggregating the roles of talent and 
ambition in the accumulation of any one person's relative wealth 
is impossible, and Dworkin instead spends considerable time sug-
gesting ways to develop a scheme of redistribution that approxi-
mately accounts for the role of talent and other individual en-
dowments.207 Our subject here is once again not an ideal theory, 
nor is it the distribution of all resources across a society. None-
theless, there are important insights to be gleaned from 
Dworkin's theory. 
Assuming a simplified version of the theory, which does not ac-
count for differential talent but does account for handicaps, 
equality of resources would call for eliminating the income-based 
approach that currently governs the allocation of rental assis-
tance, and instead providing all recipients of federal rental assis-
tance with a sum of resources of the same monetary value. This 
would mean that individuals in higher-priced locales or with low-
er incomes would not receive a more significant sum of resources 
than other recipients, nor would those who remain in assisted 
housing for a longer period of time continue to draw resources in-
definitely. 
Reforming rental assistance to distribute benefits in accord 
with a theory of equality of resources could be done by providing 
recipients with a choice among a set of bundles of assistance-all 
of which represent the same total sum of resources. Recipients 
could choose a higher benefit for a shorter period of time; or a 
smaller benefit for a longer period of time; or a gradual scaling 
down of benefits over time, on the expectation that their income 
will increase. Available bundles might include the option of allo-
cating some share of an individual's assistance towards resources, 
such as mobility assistance and housing counseling, which have 
proven effective at aiding individuals in moving into housing in 
neighborhoods with better opportunity.208 This approach would al-
206. Id. at 312-13. 
207. Id. at 313-15. 
208. See FURMAN CTR. FOR REAL ESTATE & UHilAN POLICY, AN OVERVIEW OF 
AFFIHMATIVE MARKETING AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE WESTCHESTER FAIR HOUSING 
SETI'LEMENT 12-13, 21-24, 30-32 (2011) [hereinafter AN OVERVIEW OF AFFIRMATIVE 
MAilKETING], available at http://furmancenter.org/files/publications/Furman_Center_Revi 
ew_of_Affirmative_Marketing.pdf (discussing examples of mobility assistance and housing 
counseling). Such counseling can include the provision of information regarding a poten· 
tial community, which can help to alleviate what Patrick Sharkey has termed "cognitive 
constraints" on housing choice, which comprise "individuals" mental perceptions and un-
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low individuals to decide how much of their resources to devote to 
a form of insurance against homelessness or job loss, and how 
much to expend on the possibility of gaining access to greater op-
portunity. 
The equality of resource theory's sensitivity to individual ambi-
tion aligns well with the Housing Choice Voucher program's stat-
ed goal of providing recipients with access to better opportunities 
through greater choice regarding the neighborhood and specific 
housing unit on which they use their voucher resources. At the 
same time, equality of resources emphasizes that individuals are 
responsible for the consequences of their choices with regards to 
how they use their resource allocation. That is not a perspective 
often considered in discussions of housing choice. This article fur-
ther discusses the possible structure and potential challenges for 
a bundle of resources approach to rental assistance, as well as 
additional issues of compensating for differences in individual 
endowments (rather than ambition) in Part IV. 
4. The Difference Principle 
The difference principle, most commonly associated with the 
work of John Rawls, permits inequality in the distribution of 
goods when such inequality provides a greater benefit to the least 
advantaged members of society.209 In A Theory of Justice, Rawls 
states the difference principle, the second of his two principles of 
justice, in these terms: "Social and economic inequalities are to be 
arranged so that they are both: (a) to the greatest benefit of the 
least advantaged ... and (b) attached to offices and positions 
open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity."210 As 
derstandings of which communities are possible residential destinations. Patrick Sharkey, 
Residential Mobility and the Reproduction of Unequal Neighborhoods, 14 CITYSCAPE 9, 17 
(2012). 
209. See SANDEL, supra note 193, at 70 ("Rawls's way is not to eradicate unequal en-
dowments but to arrange the scheme of benefits and burdens so that the least advantaged 
may share in the resources of the fortunate. This is the arrangement that the difference 
principle seeks to achieve."); Thomas C. Grey, Property and Need: The Welfare State and 
Theories of Distributive Justice, 28 S'l'AN. L. REV. 877, 880 (1976) ("[E]conomic assets must 
be distributed so as to maximize the position of the worst-off segment or poorest class in 
society. To put the point in another way, income and wealth are to be distributed equally 
except insofar as unequal distribution will give the poorest group more in the long run 
than they would have under complete equality, by virtue of the effect of incentives on 
overall economic prosperity."). 
210. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 154, at 302. The first principle of jus-
tice, which takes priority over the second principle, states that "[e]ach person is to have an 
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Jeremy Waldron has observed, "In general the Difference Princi-
ple is too abstract to generate, by _itself, any particular case for 
welfare provision."211 
Nonetheless, putting Rawls's broader theory of justice aside for 
a moment, this article simple borrows the powerful intuition that 
inequalities should be allowed only on the condition that they are 
arranged to the benefit of the least advantaged. There are in-
sights to be gleaned from considering how the general idea under-
lying the difference principle might inform the allocation of rental 
assistance. The idea is that inequality might be permitted in or-
der to create incentives for greater productive activity, which will 
expand the overall pot of resources and render the worst-off indi-
viduals better off. In this vein, one might contend that individuals 
denied benefits due to limited funds will be better off in the long 
run, if those given more generous assistance now, in order to 
move to higher opportunity areas, obtain better employment and 
higher incomes, which leads to increased tax revenue and, even-
tually, an increase in funding for housing benefits. This is a tre-
mendously attenuated and contingent perspective.212 It is contin-
gent on a sufficient increase in incomes and tax revenues to 
substantially increase the rental assistance available to those 
currently denied assistance.213 Moreover, the mixed success of 
voucher recipients who have moved to higher opportunity neigh-
borhoods makes it evident that the inequalities created by provid-
ing more generous assistance to certain recipients does not, in the 
long term, benefit those denied assistance. 
The more plausible assumption behind providing vouchers that 
allow individuals to move to more expensive locales with better 
equal right to the most extensive total system of equal basic liberties compatible with a 
similar system of liberty for all." Id. 
211. Waldron, supra note 29, at 789 n.45; see also RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra 
note 154, at 76 ("If it is asked in the abstract whether one distribution of a given stock of 
things to definite individuals ... is better than another, then there is simply no answer to 
this question."). Yet while Rawls initially focuses on ideal theory, he later observes that 
"the idea of a well-ordered society should also provide some guidance in thinking about 
nonideal theory, and so about difficult cases of how to deal with existing injustices." 
RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS, supra note 154, at 13. 
212. This would also only justify inequality that favors individuals able to be work. It 
would not justify inequality that shifts additional resources to those who are worse off due 
to a physical disability that precludes work. Cf. Sen, Equality of What?, supra note 152, at 
204 (contending that the difference principle would give an individual disadvantaged due 
to disability "neither more nor less" on basis of disability). 
213. Cf. id. at 203-04. 
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employment prospects is that by enabling those individuals to 
achieve self-sufficiency, limited resources will be freed up to serve 
individuals currently waiting for assistance.214 However, this is 
not an account that accords with the idea behind the difference 
principle, which is that inequalities may be allowed in order to 
reward productive behavior and increase overall prosperity and 
the total sum of resources, to the benefit of the worst off. The dif-
ference principle ultimately provides a critique of existing assis-
tance on the grounds that inequalities-in the form of a higher 
payment standard or more absolute resources being directed to-
ward individuals who move to more expensive neighborhoods be-
lieved to afford greater opportunity-should only be allowed if 
there is sufficient evidence that this leads to a net societal benefit 
that improves the position of the worst-off (by providing more 
vouchers to those currently without assistance). 
5. The Capabilities Approach 
The capability approach, developed most significantly by Am-
artya Sen, but also embraced by Martha Nussbaum and others, is 
neither a complete theory of justice, nor a theory of distributive 
justice specifically; it instead provides a distinct framework and 
set of metrics for thinking about justice and related issues. 215 Sen 
contrasts his approach, which focuses on "actual choice" among 
"feasible alternatives" for advancing justice, with "most modern 
theories of justice, which concentrate more abstractly on the 'just 
214. It is also a partial motivation for the Family Self-Sufficiency program, discussed 
infra at notes 264-66 and accompanying text. The New America Foundation has argued 
for an expansion of the Family Self Sufficiency program, specifically noting that by ena-
bling families to achieve self-sufficiency the program holds promise for freeing up limited 
resources to assist additional families. HANNAH EMPLE, NEW AMERICA FOUNDATION, 
ASSE'l'-0HIENTED RENTAL AsSISTANCE: NEXT GENERATION REFORMS FOR HUD's FAiv!ILY 
SELF-SUFFICIENCY PROGRAM 1 (2013); see also Jayme Fraser, Housing Program Promises 
to Open Door to Self-Sufficiency, Hous. CHRONICLE (Mar. 16, 2014), http:!/www.hous 
tonchronicle.com/news/politics/houston/article/Housing-program-promises-to-open-door-to-
5323093.php (discussing how the FSS program run by the Houston Housing Authority 
"frees up voucher funds for the thousands of needy families on its waiting list by helping 
current clients build a better life"). 
215. See Martha C. Nussbaum, Capabilities as Fundamental Entitlements: Sen and 
Social Justice, 2003 FEMINIST ECON. 33, 34; see also Ingrid Robeyns, The Capability Ap-
proach, in STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Edward N. Zalta, ed., 2011), available at http: 
/Ip la to. stanford.edu/archives/sum2011/entries/capability-approach/ ("The capability ap-
proach specifies what should count for interpersonal evaluations and thus provides an im-
portant aspect of a theory of social or distributive justice, yet more is needed."). 
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society."'216 Sen frequently invokes the concept of opportunity, a 
term that is central to discussions of housing vouchers, particu. 
larly in the years since the Moving to Opportunity program. As 
he writes, "The capability approach is particularly concerned with 
correcting [the] focus [in John Rawls's theory] on means rather 
than on the opportunity to fulfil ends and the substantive free. 
dom to achieve those reasoned ends."211 
The capability approach shifts the evaluation of individual 
well-being and interpersonal comparison from measures of wel-
fare and resources to functionings and capabilities as the proper 
metrics: 
Functionings represent parts of the state of a person-in particular 
the various things that he or she manages to do or be in leading a 
life. The capability of a person reflects the alternative combinations 
of functionings the person can achieve, and from which he or she can 
218 choose one collection. 
Capabilities provide "the relevant informational base" for evalu-
ating particular polices, rather than welfare or resources. 219 
Capability is "a kind of freedom: the substantive freedom to 
achieve alternative functioning combinations (or, less formally 
put, the freedom to achieve various lifestyles)."220 The capability 
approach focuses on the freedom of individuals to live lives "they 
have reason to value."221 It is "inescapably pluralist" and thereby 
216. AMARTYA SEN, THE IDEA OF JUSTICE 8-9 (2009) {hereinafter SEN, THE IDEA OF 
JUS'l'ICE); see also Robeyns, supra note 215 ("[Sen] ... is averse of building a well-defined 
theory of justice but rather prefers to investigate how real-life unjust situations can be 
turned into more just situations, even if perfect justice is unattainable."). 
217. SEN, THE IDEA OF JUSTICE, supra note 216, at 234. Sen critiques the "exalted 
place" that Rawls grants to the primary goods as a metric, on the grounds that it fails to 
acknowledge the personal and environmental factors affecting different people, which can 
result in "widely varying opportunities to convert general resources (like income and 
wealth) into capabilities-what they can or cannot actually do." Id. at 261. 
218. Amartya Sen, Capability and Well-Being, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF ECONOMICS 270, 
271 (Daniel M. Hausman ed., 3d ed. 2008) [hereinafter Sen, Capability and Well-Being]. In 
an earlier work Sen provided a slightly different definition of the first term: 
"'[F]unctionings' ... reflects the various things a person may value doing or being." 
AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM 75 (1999). 
219. Sen, Capability and Well-Being, supra note 218, at 271; see also SEN, 'l'HE IDEA OF 
JUSTICE, supra note 216, at 231 ("In contrast with the utility-based or resource-based lines 
of thinking, individual advantage is judged in the capability approach by a person's capa-
bility to do things he or she has reason to value."). 
220. SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM, supra note 218, at 75; see also Sen, Capability 
and Well-Being, supra note 218, at 273 ("[H]uman capabilities constitute an important 
part of individual freedom."). 
221. SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM, supra note 218, at 85. 
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broadens "the range of our evaluative reasoning." 222 This sensitiv-
ity to a plurality of values resonates with the goals ascribed to 
federal rental assistance. Housing Choice Vouchers, to the extent 
that they enable recipients to exercise individual choice in select-
ing the unit and neighborhood in which they will reside, aid recip-
ients in achieving the capability to live out a plurality of values 
through their residential choices. 
According to Sen, the freedom to make choices of this kind is 
valuable for two distinct reasons, First, greater freedom expands 
an individual's alternatives and the opportunities to achieve the 
objectives they personally value.223 Second, "the process of choice 
itself' and the ability to freely act may be valuable to an individ-
ual.224 This latter point provides a reason to pause and consider 
how truly free a household is when deciding how to use housing 
resources, particularly vouchers. Households face structural ob-
stacles-such as housing discrimination, landlords who will not 
accept vouchers, and a lack of affordable housing where vouchers 
might be used in a given locale-as well as personal challenges. 
From the perspective of a capabilities approach, equality of re-
sources "falls short because it fails to take account of the fact that 
individuals need differing levels of resources if they are to come 
up to the same level of capability to function."225 Sen argues that 
resources are merely useful as means to some other end. There-
fore, if one assumes some congruence between resources and ca-
pability, "why not put equality of resources in its place as a way 
of getting to equality of the capability to achieve ... ?"226 While of 
normative interest for a determination of the ultimate ends of a 
concern with equality, it is not clear that the chosen resolution of 
this question of priority would alter our analysis of the ideal 
structure of rental assistance. 
222. Id. at 76-77. 
223. SEN, THE IDEA OF JUSTICE, supra note 216, at 228; see also Sen, Capability and 
Well-Being, supra note 218, at 278 ("[F]reedom may have intrinsic importance for the per-
son's well-being achievement. Acting freely and being able to choose may be directly con-
ducive to well-being, not just because more freedom may make better alternatives availa-
ble."). There is also, an important distinction between capability in the form of "well-being 
freedom," the freedom "to advance one's own well-being," and "agency freedom," which en-
ables one to advance "whatever goals and values a person has reason to advance." SEN, 
THE IDEA OF JUSTICE, supra note 216, at 288-89. 
224. SEN, THE IDEA OF JUSTICE, supra note 216, at 228. 
225. Nussbaum, supra note 215, at 35. 
226. SEN, THE IDEA OF JUSTICE, supra note 216, at 265. 
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Moreover, there remains the need to balance a desire for per-
fect equality, regardless of our metric, with the practical chal-
lenges of distributing benefits through a national system of rental 
assistance administered by local entities. While trying to match 
resources to individual recipients in a way that achieves precisely 
equal levels of capability may be administratively impossible, the 
capability approach's concern with the differing abilities of indi-
viduals to "convert resources into actual functioning"221 can be 
partially addressed through exceptions from time limits or benefit 
reductions for elderly and disabled recipients of rental assis-
tance.228 A more challenging question is how to equitably respond 
to communities that have been subject to particular histories of 
discrimination and might merit special resources to correct these 
injustices and their detrimental effects on individual capabilities. 
For both issues, the capabilities approach, argued in more detail 
in Part IV, calls for exceptions and additional resources under the 
same circumstances as equality of resources. 
C. Existing Recipients and Property Interests 
'fhe discussion so far has not addressed a question that is of 
particular concern for the principle of equality of welfare: Does 
the termination of existing benefits impose a greater loss of wel-
fare on an individual than the denial of benefits? In any particu-
lar case, this may require an evaluation of the alternatives avail-
able to individuals. More generally, however, it calls for 
consideration of whether existing recipients of rental assistance 
have some stronger claim to continued benefits than eligible non-
recipients. Distinguishing between existing beneficiaries and po-
tential beneficiaries is not only relevant for equality of welfare. 
The loss of rental assistance may affect the resources available to 
an individual or their capabilities differently than the denial of 
such assistance. This is attributable in part to the role of rental 
assistance in enabling an individual to obtain and remain in a 
particular unit of housing that, over time, becomes less of a fun-
gible resource and more of a personal property interest. 
227. Nussbaum, supra note 215, at 35. 
228. None of the housing agencies that imposed time limits pursuant to authority un-
der the Moving to Work program applied those limits to disabled or elderly households. 
See APPLIED REAL ESTATE ANALYSIS, INC. & THE URilAN INST., supra note 146, at 5. 
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Margaret Radin, in the context of residential rent control, has 
argued that it makes sense to favor current tenants over those 
who are new to the market and lack a personal connection to 
property. 22 !) The intuition that drives a preference for current res-
idents is that an individual who has resided in a particular space 
for a significant time finds their identity and personality "inter-
twined" with that space.230 It is no longer simply a fungible prop-
erty interest with solely exchange value, but instead possesses 
certain personal value. Similarly, C. Edwin Baker, in discussing 
the relationship between property rights and other constitutional 
liberties, distinguishes the welfare and personhood functions of 
property, their respective contributions to individual well-being, 
and the legal support each merits: "Generally, protection of 
claims to generic types of resources adequately serves the.welfare 
function. In contrast, the personhood function characteristically 
requires protection of specific, unique objects or spaces."231 
In a companion article, the author of this article plans to devel-
op an understanding of rental assistance as something more than 
the "new property" articulated by Charles Reich232 and embraced 
by the Supreme Court in Goldberg v. Kelly, 233 leading to enhanced 
procedural due process protections for a range of public benefits. 
The notion of public benefits as "new property" focuses on the 
welfare function of property and the role of generic forms of prop-
erty in furthering individual well-being.231 Rental assistance, 
however, operates in a different manner than TANF, food stamps, 
Social Security, and other government assistance. Rental assis-
tance is tied closely to a particular housing unit-not only in the 
229. Margaret Jane Radin, Residential Rent Control, 15 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 350, 3G5 
(1986) ("A tenancy, no less than a single.family house, is the sort of property interest in 
which a person becomes self-invested; and after the self-investment has taken place, re-
tention of the interest becomes a priority claim over curtailment of merely fungible inter-
ests of others."); see also Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 
957, 993-94 (1982) (arguing that "the intuition that the leasehold is personal" has con-
tributed to common law developments granting greater rights to tenants). 
230. See C. Edwin Baker, Property and its Relation to Constitutionally Protected Liber-
ty, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 741, 747 (1986). 
231. Id. 
232. See generally Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (19G4). 
233. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 n.8 (1970) (citing Charles A. Reich, Individu-
al Rights and Social Welfare: The Emerging Legal Issues, 74 YALE L.J. 1245, 1255 (1965)) 
("It may be realistic today to regard welfare entitlements as more like 'property' than a 
'gratuity.' Much of the existing wealth in this country takes the form of rights that do not 
fall within traditional common-law concepts of property."). 
234. See Reich, The New Property, supra note 232, at 733. 
1122 UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49:1071 
obvious situations of public housing and project-based Section 8, 
but also for housing vouchers because a recipient must identify a 
unit whose owner is willing to accept a voucher and must confirm 
it meets the required quality standards. 235 Although individuals 
can move to a new unit with their voucher, doing so is often quite 
challenging in practice.236 When the rent for a particular unit ris-
es, the voucher, which determines a household's contribution to-
wards rent based not on the unit's rent, but rather a set percent-
age of the recipient's income, operates so as to ensure that the 
household can continue to reside in that particular unit.237 As 
such, the loss of rental assistance will, for most recipients, mean 
not only the loss of some fungible sum of money, but also a high 
likelihood of the loss of a particular home to which they have a 
personal connection. Accordingly, the recognition and protection 
of personhood claims "might require inegalitarian and possibly 
unjust distributions."238 The companion article will further devel-
op a normative account of rental assistance that situates this as-
sistance within broader legal and theoretical understandings of 
property. This account will aim to inform the determination of 
when and how divergence from distributive justice principles 
might be justified so as to protect the distinct property interests 
of current rental assistance beneficiaries. 239 For now, this inquiry 
235. See supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
236. See supra note 34 and accompanying text. 
237. See Radin, Residential Rent Control, supra note 229, at 366 ("Part of the stability 
of context associated with the home could be stability of the proportion of one's income re-
quired to maintain it."). 
238. Baker, supra note 230, at 762-63 ("The differences between the nature of welfare 
and personhood claims suggest that the state could not and should not guarantee the ful-
fillment of all personhood claims on resources. The importance of the personhood function 
of property may, however, justify a constitutional requirement that the state treat claims 
to property serving this function with special concern and generally in a more accommo-
dating fashion than it treats claims to property valued, for example, primarily for its ex-
change value."); see also D. Benjamin Barros, Home as a Legal Concept, 46 SANTA CLARA 
L. REV. 255, 257 (2006) ("[Radin] ... argues that the possession of homes should be fa-
vored against competing interests on the basis of an intuitive view that people become 
personally connected to their homes."). 
239. Concepts of personhood are not the only basis for linking housing assistance with 
more traditional forms of property. As Eduardo Penalver has argued, the role of private 
ownership in securing individual freedom by providing a place where one is free to do as 
one pleases is as much a product of personal privacy as it is of property ownership: 
"Renters, for example, can enjoy substantial privacy without owning the property in which 
they enjoy it." Eduardo M. Penalver, Property as Entrance, 91 VA. L. REV. 1889, 1930-31 
(2005). To the extent that housing assistance plays a necessary and direct role in provid-
ing recipients with the privacy of a rental unit-and all the broader benefits attributed to 
such privacy-this provides an additional reason for understanding housing assistance as 
a form of property somewhere between traditional conceptions of private property and 
2015] HOUSING RESOURCE BUNDLES 1123 
will be put to the side and turn to a further elucidation of the 
normative prescriptions suggested by distributive justice theory. 
III. TOWARDS A MORE PRINCIPLED FEDERAL HOUSING 
ASSIS'l'ANCE POLICY 
In an ideal world, federal rental assistance would take the form 
of an entitlement along the lines suggested by the Bipartisan Pol-
icy Center's Housing Commission, which proposed making assis-
tance available to all households with incomes below 30% of 
AMI. 210 However, in the absence of political support for increasing 
HUD's funding for rental assistance to a level sufficient to pro-
vide broader assistance an issue of scarcity arises. In a world of 
limited resources it is not enough to simply decry existing hous-
ing programs as inequitable. Scarcity-regardless of its cause-
instead demands careful consideration of what a more just distri-
bution of this finite benefit would look like. As discussed in Part I, 
there have been a number of proposals in the legal, policy, and 
economics literature-as well as legislative proposals-to reform 
the structure of federal housing assistance. 2H My contention is 
that before delineating specific reforms we must first take a step 
back to evaluate how this assistance might be more equitably dis-
tributed among eligible recipients. To that end, this part begins 
by extensively outlining the implications of the analysis in Part II 
if applied solely to the allocation of existing resources among eli-
gible beneficiaries of the three primary HUD rental assistance 
programs. The analysis then expands to consider how the housing 
resource bundle approach can inform a more thorough reform of 
all federal housing policy-including in particular the LIHTC and 
the HMID-to better accord with principles of distributive justice. 
A. Prioritizing the Provision of Housing 
With the exception of desert-based theories, the approaches to 
distributive justice discussed in Part II support the conclusion 
that federal rental assistance funding (particularly for Housing 
"new property." 
240. BIPARTISAN Hous. COMM'N OF 2013, supra note 15, at 89. An analysis performed 
on the Commission's behalf by Abt Associates estimates that this additional coverage 
would cost $22.5 billion annually. Id. at 90. 
241. See supra Part I.D. 
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Choice Vouchers, project-based Section 8, and to a lesser extent 
public housing) should be shifted even further towards serving a 
greater share of the lowest income households. Such a shift would 
also better conform to plausible conceptions of taxpayer prefer-
ences212 and the core purpose of affordable housing policy-
providing affordable housing. If the resources allocated to HUD's 
rental assistance programs remain at the present level and the 
allocation of this assistance is to accord with norms of distributive 
justice, then the goals of providing access to higher opportunity 
neighborhoods and furthering economic and racial integration 
must be subsidiary to efforts to expand the number of households 
served. More specifically, these efforts should only be sustained to 
the extent they can be done without adversely affecting the num-
bers of households served. 
There is an additional reason for focusing federal rental hous-
ing policy on the goal of serving a larger share of eligible house-
holds, at the expense of these other goals. Quite simply, federal 
rental assistance, as currently structured, has either failed to ad-
vance these additional goals or has achieved successes too minor 
to justify the distributional inequities they exacerbate. Robert El-
lickson made an analogous point in critiquing mixed-income 
housing programs, drawing attention to recent studies that "sug-
gest that the benefits of social integration are seldom as great as 
advocates of mixed-income projects suppose."213 As such, he con-
tends that social integration alone provides insufficient justifica-
tion for the high cost of producing mixed-income housing.211 Alt-
hough "the Housing Choice Voucher program was ... created, in 
part, to help low-income households reach a broader range of 
neighborhoods and schools," voucher recipients instead "are locat-
ing near lower-performing schools than are poor families in gen-
eral."21" Similarly, while the Moving to Opportunity program led 
242. See supra note 12 and accompanying text. A 1973 HUD review of housing assis-
tance reported data showing substantially stronger public support for government assis-
tance to house low-income families than for similar assistance to moderate-income fami-
lies. HOUSING IN nm SEVENTIES, supra note 14, at 88 ("In a recent survey of attitudes 
towards Federal Government assistance, the public supported governmental help for hous-
ing for low income families by a margin of 68 percent to 12 percent, while rejecting similar 
assistance to families of moderate income by 59 percent to 27 percent."). 
243. Ellickson, supra note 1, at 985. 
244. Id. 
245. KEHEN MEHTENS Hmm ET AL., MACARTHUH FOUND., How HOUSING MATTEHS: 
HOUSING CHOICE VOUCHEH HOLDEHS AHE NOT REACHING H!GHEH-PEHFOHMING SCHOOLS 
1-2 (2014) [hereinafter How HOUSING MATTEHS); see Keren Mertens Horn et al., Do Hous-
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to initial improvements in participating families' neighborhoods, 
these improvements "faded quickly, due to moves back to high-
poverty neighborhoods and rising poverty in the destination 
neighborhoods of experimental group families."246 The program's 
effects on parents have been minimal. 247 As· for children, there 
have been slight positive effects in school performance and sense 
of safety among girls, but neutral or less promising effects for 
boys, including an increasing likelihood to commit property 
• 2.rn crimes. 
Existing voucher policy is not the sole cause of this reality. It is 
attributable in part to the interaction between the preferences of 
recipients and structural obstacles-including discriminatory 
ing Choice Voucher Holders Live Near Good Schools?, 24 J. HOUSING ECON. 109, 110 
(2014); see also Kirk McClure, Deconcentrating Poverty with Housing Programs, 74 J. AM. 
PLAN. Ass'N 90, 91 (2008) (finding, based on analysis of HUD administrative datasets, 
that "[h]ousing vouchers supplied to households are not helping renters move to low-
poverty areas any more effectively than are current project-based subsidies"). Writing im-
mediately before the housing market downturn, Kirk McClure found that "at the most 
general level, the project-based . . . [LIHTC] program is deconcentrating low income 
households into low-poverty areas more effectively than the household-based [Housing 
Choice Voucher] program ... . "Id. at 95. More recently, Horn, Ellen, and Schwartz found 
that LIHTC households gain access to better schools than Housing Choice Voucher recipi-
ents, but noted, as discussed above, that the LIHTC "serves slightly better off families, 
who might have found their way to higher-performing schools had they been given a 
voucher." How HOUSING MATTERS, supra, at 2-3. 
246. PATRICK SIIAHKEY, STUCK IN PLACE: URBAN NEIGHBORHOODS AND THE END OF 
PROGRESS TOWARD RACIAL EQUALITY 134 (2013) [hereinafter SHARKEY, STUCK IN PLACE] 
(citing studies from 1928 to 2008 analyzing the ghetto concept). See generally LISA 
SANUONMATSU ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF Rous. & URBAN DEV., MOVING TO OPPORTUNITY FOR 
FAIR HOUSING DEMONSTRATION PROGRAM: FINAL IMPACTS EVALUATION, at v (2011) (find-
ing that ten to fifteen years after initial enrollment, Moving to Opportunity participants 
lived in safer and lower poverty neighborhoods and experienced improved health, but had 
no improvements in educational, employment, and income outcomes when compared to a 
control group). 
247. SHARKEY, STUCK IN PLACE, supra note 246, at 145. However, researchers did find 
significant improvements in parents' sense of safety in their neighborhood, mental health, 
and levels of obesity. Id. at 145. 
248. Id. at 145; see Ellickson, supra note 1, at 1012-15 (reviewing studies that "cast 
doubt on the traditional view that economic integration gives rise to significant social ben-
efits"); see also Michael R. Diamond, De-Concentrating Poverty: De-Constructing a Theory 
and the Failure of Hope 3 (Georgetown Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper No. 
12-155, 2012) ("On the practical level, studies have shown repeatedly that many of the 
hoped-for fundamental benefits of de-concentration have not been achieved."). Michael Di-
amond criticizes programs that are focused on the involuntary deconcentration of poverty 
on the grounds that-even assuming those relocated achieved the supposed benefits-the 
programs only serve a small fraction of those households living in neighborhoods of con-
centrated poverty. Id. at 4; see Edgar 0. Olsen, Pursuing Poverty Deconcentration Dis-
tracts from Housing Policy Reforms That Would Have a Greater Effect on Poverty Allevia-
tion, 16 CITYSCAPE 135, 136 (2014) ("The best evidence suggests that the benefits to low-
income households of living in a low-poverty neighborhood are small."). 
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rental practices and landlords unwilling to accept vouchers-that 
prevent voucher holders from moving closer to higher performing 
schools. A number of factors besides neighborhood quality-
including proximity to social support networks and familiarity 
with an existing neighborhood-also contribute to the locational 
preferences of low-income residents. 249 This article's proposed 
changes, however, would not affect either of these factors. The 
structural obstacles are simply beyond the scope of this article 
and the changes proposed. As for individual preferences, the bun-
dle approach would better enable those who would prefer to move 
to better neighborhoods (or those that would at least entertain 
the possibility) to have access to a set of resources-depending on 
how individual bundles are designed-that would provide more 
robust support for such a move, albeit subject to the possibility of 
a shallower or more finite subsidy. I turn now to a more detailed 
discussion of the proposed housing resource bundles model of dis-
tributing assistance. 
B. Housing Resource Bundles as a More Equitable Rental 
Assistance Policy 
1. Housing Resource Bundles Further Explained 
The analysis in Part II suggests that the equality of resources 
theory and the capability approach most closely align with the 
stated goals of federal rental assistance and provide the most 
practical and policy relevant guidelines for a more equitable dis-
tribution of these benefits. Housing is itself a resource, providing 
stability and security and enabling individuals to pursue life 
goals they choose for themselves and their families. Repackaging 
rental assistance as a set of housing resource bundles would pro-
249. See Kimberly Skobba & Edward G. Goetz, Mobility Decisions of Very Low-Income 
Households, 15 C!TYSCAI'E 155, 166 (2013); id. at 167 ("The constraints faced by these fam-
ilies and the reliance on interpersonal sources of information and support meant that 
neighborhood concerns were mostly irrelevant, both in their search for housing and in 
their evaluation of that housing. When neighborhoods were important to the participants 
of this study, it was for the ways in which they did or did not enable the families to fulfill 
other basic needs. That is, the availability of transportation, affordable and accessible gro-
cery shopping, and proximity to friends and family were listed as frequently as crime and 
safety as the important aspects of neighborhood."); see also Ellickson, supra note 1, at 
1015 (citing Sheryll D. Cashin, Middle-Class Blach Suburbs and the State of Integration: A 
Post-Integrationist Vision for Metropolitan America, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 729, 737 (2001)) 
(noting that "most African Americans state in surveys that they prefer to live in a neigh-
borhood that is mostly African American"). 
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vide an administratively feasible mechanism for more equitable 
distribution of this discrete resource while creatively furthering a 
range of programmatic goals. Recipients of rental assistance 
would choose a set of bundles comprised of an equal total sum of 
resources (measured by total cost). Resources included in a bun-
dle would all be directed towards either housing itself or other re-
sources related to obtaining and maintaining housing. Recipients 
would be given a finite menu of bundles to choose from, which 
might include a higher rental benefit for a shorter period of time, 
a smaller benefit for a longer period of time, or a gradual scaling 
down of benefits over time (based on the expectation that their 
income will increase). Certain bundles would include the option of 
allocating some share of an individual's assistance towards re-
sources, such as mobility assistance250 and housing counseling,251 
which have proven effective at aiding individuals in moving into 
housing in neighborhoods with better opportunities. The bundle 
of resources approach would provide individuals with the freedom 
to select sets of resources that best align with their own goals and 
expand their capabilities, while still potentially furthering addi-
tional programmatic goals beyond the provision of adequate hous-
ing, including economic and racial integration, access to oppor-
tunity, and movement towards self-sufficiency.252 However, in 
keeping with the broader goal of more equitably distributing fi-
250. A recent study of recipients of Moving to Opportunity and Welfare to Work vouch-
ers found that participants with access to a vehicle found housing in safer neighborhoods 
with lower poverty and were more likely to find employment than those without a vehicle. 
ROLF PENDALL E'I' AL., URBAN INST., DHIVING TO OPPORTUNITY: UNDERSTANDING THE 
LINKS AMONG TRANSPORTATION ACCESS, RESIDENTIAL OUTCOMES, AND ECONOMIC 
OPPORTUNITY FOR HOUSING VOUCHER RECIPIENTS i-iii (2014); see also AN OVERVIEW OF 
AFFIRMA'l'IVE MARKETING, supra note 208, at 12-13 (discussing how providing access to 
vehicles has proven particularly helpful for encouraging mobility among participants in 
housing mobility program established in the Baltimore area). 
251. See McClure, supra note 245, at 96 ("Intensive placement counseling of assisted 
households appears to be a valuable component of any effort seeking to deconcentrate pov-
erty."). 
252. Along these lines, Zachary Bray argues that "in requiring assisted low-income 
families to find their own housing on the rental market after empowering them with 
vouchers, Section 8 is designed to enhance the dignity and autonomy of its recipients, 
while reducing any social stigma that may attach to visible project-based assistance." 
Zachary Bray, The New Progressive Property and the Low-Income Housing Conflict, 2012 
BYU L. REV. 1109, 1135-86. One might question the extent to which, in practice, the 
search for housing with a Section 8 voucher enhances dignity and reduces social stigma. 
Nonetheless, it is evident that the choice provided through vouchers, even if seriously con-
strained, grants recipients greater autonomy than project-based assistance. Allowing indi-
viduals to choose not only where to use their housing assistance, but also how that assis-
tance will be structured and what additional resources and support they will receive would 
only further enhance individual autonomy. 
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nite resources, individuals would obtain only one bundle during 
their lifetime (although they need not use all of the resources in 
their bundle at once, but could instead use it at separate points 
throughout their life).253 
In addition to ensuring that recipients receive an equal sum of 
resources, the resource bundle approach will provide recipients 
with the freedom to choose the specific bundle of resources that 
will afford them the means to best promote the ends they desire 
or pursue the goals they value. 251 One person may value the quali-
ty of housing less than another individual and choose a bundle 
with a smaller monthly benefit that ensures assistance for a 
longer period of time, thereby obtaining greater security against 
the future loss of housing. Another person might value the poten-
tial for greater opportunity and desire the set of resource that will 
best enable him or her to move to a better neighborhood and to 
move towards greater self-sufficiency. As such, the process of 
choosing a set of bundles will also provide an individual with a 
greater sense of ownership over the resources they select. 
If we assume no changes to current funding levels and no 
changes to the number of eligible, but underserved, households, 
time limits would be necessary to ensure a more equitable distri-
bution of HUD's rental assistance resources. Providing a choice of 
bundles, including phase outs of assistance or a longer term of as-
sistance at a lower amount, could mitigate some of the potentially 
harsh effects of imposing time limits on particular households. 255 
As noted earlier, there is empirical evidence indicating that a 
substantial reduction in the maximum subsidy available to par-
ticipating households would still provide sufficient funds to ob-
253. It would also be possible to allow individuals to go to the back of a waiting list for 
bundles if they have exhausted their initial bundle. 
254. See supra note 223 (discussing the relevance of such freedom to the capability ap-
proach). 
255. Non-elderly and non-disabled households receiving voucher assistance in 2010 
received this assistance for a median period of forty-eight months. SAHD & ALVAREZ-
SANCHEZ, supra note 184, at 9. Longer periods of voucher assistance are correlated with 
higher-cost rental markets, so time limits coupled with an approach that presents a choice 
of bundles of equal resources (which would allow a recipient a longer period of support in a 
less expensive location) may lead more beneficiaries to move to lower-cost markets, poten-
tially reducing the cost of providing those households with assistance. While 57% of non-
elderly and non-disabled households living in the highest rent geographic areas received 
assistance for more than five years, in the lowest rent area, only 30% of recipients received 
voucher assistance for more than five years. Id. 
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tain housing that satisfies program standards.25u In addition, a 
few communities have used grants through the Housing Oppor-
tunities for Persons with AIDS program to provide shallow, flat 
subsidies "designed to stretch out finite resources to serve a 
greater number of people."257 A program in Alameda County, Cali-
fornia provided a shallow monthly subsidy, which was not based 
on household income, of $225 each month to a single person in a 
one-bedroom unit. 258 Recipients of this support, on average, had 
been paying 68% of their monthly income on rent prior to receiv-
ing the subsidy and paid 42% of their income on rent with the 
subsidy. 259 Although they were moderately rent-burdened (paying 
more than 30% of their income on rent), after two years 96% of 
program participants were still in rental housing, a dramatically 
larger percentage than the 10% of individuals in a comparison 
group who remained stably housed.260 
2. Bundles as Incentives Towards Self-Sufficiency 
Specific bundles could be structured to create stronger incen-
tives for self-sufficiency. Although many current recipients of 
rental assistance work,261 the current benefit structure does not 
encourage work: "Because households are required to pay 30 per-
cent of their gross income in rents, those who receive vouchers ef-
fectively pay a 30-percent marginal tax rate on income."2u2 Empir-
256. See supra notes 174-76 and accompanying text .. 
257. MARY CUNNINGHAM, JOSH LEOPOLD & PAMELA LEE, Ulm. INST., A PROPOSED 
DEMONSTRATION OF A FLAT RENTAL SUBSIDY FOR VERY Low INCOME HOUSEHOLDS 12 
(2014), available at http://www.urban.org/U ploadedPDF/413031-a-proposed-demonstrati 
on.pdf. 
258. Id. at 12-13 (citing Lisa K. Dasinger & Richard Speiglman, Homelessness Preven-
tion: The Effect of a Shallow Rent Subsidy on Housing Outcomes Among People with HIV 
or AIDS, 11 Ams BEHAV. 128, 129-30 (2007)). In comparison, an individual receiving as-
sistance through the voucher program, whose only income was Supplemental Security In-
come, would have received a subsidy of $421 per month. Id. at 13. 
259. Id. 
260. Id. However, the authors of the underlying report "note that unobserved differ-
ences between the treatment and control groups, such as prior rental history, may help 
explain the stark differences in housing stability." Id. 
261. See SARD & ALVAHEZ-SANCHEZ, supra note at 184, 5-6. 
262. Green, supra note 109, at 51-52 ("All housing assistance programs produce implic-
itly high marginal tax rates, through clawbacks, that can discourage work."). Despite the 
apparent disincentives for work created by current program structure, administrative data 
regarding the labor force attachment of Housing Choice Voucher recipients reveals that 
66% of non-elderly and non-disabled Housing Choice Voucher households either worked in 
2010 or had worked recently. SAHD & ALVAREZ-SANCHEZ, supra note 184, at 5-6. An addi-
tional 11 % of these households received assistance through a state 'I'ANF program that 
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ical studies failed to establish a consensus on whether existing 
rental assistance policy encourages or discourages self-
sufficiency.2G3 Nonetheless, in 1990, HUD introduced the Family 
Self-Sufficiency ("FSS") program, which was designed to reduce 
potential work disincentives created by the formula used to set 
public housing and voucher rents. 261 Rather than divert increased 
wage earnings towards rent, the program-which is available to 
voucher recipients and public housing recipients-places in-
creased earnings into an individual savings account, which can be 
drawn upon after certain education, training, or work-related 
goals are reached. 265 The FSS program also provides participants 
with additional assistance directed toward achieving self-
sufficiency.266 Although local PHAs work with assisted individuals 
imposes work requirements on most adult recipients. Id. at 6. 
263. Reviewing the available evidence as of 2002 regarding the effect of housing assis· 
tance on self-sufficiency, Mark Shroder concluded that "[h]ousing assistance is not persua· 
sively associated with any effect on employment, positive or negative." Mark Shrader, Does 
Housing Assistance Perversely Affect Self-Sufficiency? A Review Essay, 11 .J. HOUSING 
ECON. 381, 383 (2002); see also Deven Carlson et al., Long-Term Earnings and Employ-
ment Effects of Housing Voucher Receipt, 71 J. URB. ECON. 128, 133, 135, 143 (2012) (using 
propensity score matching to compare voucher recipients in Wisconsin to non-recipients 
and finding a negligible of voucher receipt on work effort" but gains in quarters worked 
per year relative to the matched comparison group for recipients after six years). However, 
a subsequent paper reported that since Schroder's review five rigorous studies provided 
support for the claim that housing assistance "may slow participants' progress towards 
self-sufficiency" but concluded that "empirical work on the topic remains far from unani· 
mous." Larry A. Rosenthal, A Review of Recent Literature on Housing Assistance and Self-
Sufficiency, 12 INST. OF BUS. & ECON. RES., Working Paper No. W07-008 (2007). 
264. EMPLE, supra note 214, at 5-6 (2013); see Julian Castro, U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. & 
URBAN DEV., Family Self-Sufficiency (FSS) Program, http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/ 
HUD?src=/program_offices/public_indian_housing/programs/hcv/fss (last visited Apr. 3, 
2015) [hereinafter Family Self-Sufficiency (FSS) Program]. FSS services are provided via 
partnerships with local employers and service providers. Id. HUD does not fund these ser· 
vices, but does fund FSS program coordinators, who work with participants to obtain as· 
sistance in achieving self-sufficiency and oversee the escrow accounts. Id. at 9. The pro· 
gram was originally known as "Operation Bootstrap" and introduced in 1990 through the 
Cranston-Gonzalez National Affordable Housing Act. See Cranston-Gonzalez National Af. 
fordable Housing Act, Pub. L. No. 101-625, § 554, 104 Stat. 4079, 4085, 4225 (1990) (codi-
fied at 42 U.S.C. § 1437u (2012)); see EMPLE, supra note 214, at 6. Regulations governing 
the FSS program are found at 24 C.F.R pt. 984 (2014). 
265. Kirk McClure, Section 8 and Movement to .Job Opportunity: Experience After Wel-
fare Reform in Kansas City, 15 HOUSING POL'Y DEBATE 99, 108 (2004). 
266. See Family Self-Sufficiency (FSS) Program, supra note 264. Participants execute a 
five-year FSS Contract of Participation that "specifies the rights and responsibilities of 
[thf! family and the Public Housing Authority] and the goals and services for the family." 
Fact Sheet: Family Self-Sufficiency (FSS) Program, U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. & URllAN DEV. 
(2014), available at http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/documents/huddoc?id=fssfactsheet.pdf. 
A participant is not required to exit rental assistance upon graduation from the FSS pro· 
gram, but the program clearly seeks to increase recipients' rent contributions via in· 
creased earnings feasibly to enable recipients to leave the program. EMPLE, supra note 
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to coordinate services, those services are delivered by local third-
party entities, resulting in a wide variation in programs.267 Relia-
ble tracking of FSS program participation and outcomes has 
proven challenging, 268 but HUD reported that in fiscal year 2011, 
nearly 3000 families successfully completed an FSS contract, with 
over half seeing increases in earnings, and approximately 20% of 
voucher households in the program no longer needing rental as-
sistance upon completing their contracts.269 
Using the FSS as a model, housing resource bundles might be 
designed to include similar services directed at achieving self-
sufficiency-such as education, job training, and assistance find-
ing and securing employment.270 If assistance is distributed on the 
basis of equality of resources, then a recipient would receive a 
specific quantity of resources to access over the course of their 
lifetime, so achieving self-sufficiency would not necessarily free 
up additional resource for other potential beneficiaries. However, 
if a household truly becomes self-sufficient before using up all the 
resources in their bundle and never needs to draw upon that pool 
of resources again then at the end of that individual's life, addi-
tional resources will remain. Such success might inform future 
program budgets and-so long as all eligible recipients are not 
served-allow for the provision of assistance to a greater share of 
individuals. Alternatively, using a similar structure to FSS, an 
individual might be allowed to direct some of the resources they 
would receive as rental assistance into an escrow account that 
they can eventually access for other purposes, such as home own-
ership. 
214, at 5. 
267. EMPLE, supra note 214, at 7. 
268. See U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, RENTAL HOUSING AsSISTANCE, supra 
note 146, at 34 (finding that HUD lacks reliable data on program participation and there-
fore cannot effectively evaluate programs). HUD commissioned a national evaluation of 
the FSS program, which will be completed in 2018. EMPLE, supra note 214, at 14. 
269. EMPLE, supra note 214, at 10. Hannah Empie notes that despite the program's 
"conceptual attractiveness ... , rigorous evaluation of the program's direct impact on par-
ticipants is scarce." Id. 
270. According to legislation creating the FSS program, the supportive services provid-
ed to a participating household "may include" child care, transportation, education, job 
training, substance abuse treatment and counseling, money management, household 
management, parenting skills, and "any other services and resources appropriate to assist 
eligible families to achieve economic independence and self-sufficiency." Cranston-
Gonzalez National Affordable Housing Act, Pub. L. No. 101-625, 104 Stat. 4079, 4226-27 
(1990) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1437u(c)(2) (1994)). 
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Existing FSS programs have found that a lack of employment 
opportunities for participants stymies efforts to move out of pov-
erty.211 The FSS relies upon fostering partnerships with local non-
profits and an FSS coordinator who works with participants to 
access these resources.272 The housing resource bundle approach, 
by allowing recipients to take their bundle of resources anywhere 
they are able to find housing, could encounter even greater chal-
lenges in the absence of the developed framework of support 
found in the FSS program. This concern might be addressed, 
however, by tying specific bundles to particular jurisdictions, 
within which a network of resources akin to those provided 
through the FSS program has been developed. These resources 
would be paid for through a portion of the funds in each partici-
pant's housing resource bundle. 
3. Confronting Disparities in Capabilities and Specific Histories 
of Discrimination 
Dworkin and Sen both raise concerns regarding the inequitable 
allocation of talents and of capabilities. They each reject the posi-
tion that such factors should be allowed to lead to inequitable 
subsequent distributions of goods. 273 The proposed allocation of 
equal bundles of housing resources will not account for discrepan-
cies in talents or capabilities. Precisely accounting for differences 
in talents and capabilities would prove impossible and beyond the 
expertise (and administrative feasibility) of housing agencies. Yet 
there are possibilities for taking account of certain factors analo-
gous to disparities in talents or capabilities that historically have 
had pernicious effects on access to housing and to particular 
neighborhoods. 
Imagine a specific housing resource bundle, the "opportunity 
bundle," that contains, in addition to a specific sum of rental as-
sistance, a set of mobility and counseling resources designed to 
enable a move to a higher opportunity area and productive use of 
the opportunities that a locale provides. The ability of two indi-
viduals who select this opportunity bundle to achieve the same 
set of capabilities with that bundle will be affected by numerous 
271. See EMPLE, supra note 214, at 16-17. 
272. See id. at 7. 
273. See Dworkin, Equality of Welfare, supra note 29, at 208; Sen, Equality of What?, 
supra note 152, at 217-18. 
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factors. As noted at various points above, there are multiple 
structural obstacles to the exercise of choice in housing markets. 
These include the effects of discrimination both on the market of 
potential housing available to a recipient of rental assistance and 
on a recipient's living situation prior to receiving assistance. 
To remedy such specific, established instances of prior system-
atic discrimination, a local PHA should be allowed (and where 
necessary provided additional funds) to distribute assistance in a 
manner that deviates from a baseline of equality of resources. In 
such cases, providing enhanced bundles that are similar to the 
remedies provided in certain public housing desegregation cases 
would be justified.274 Provision of such bundles could be under-
stood not only as a form of corrective justice,275 but also as a way 
to compensate for initial disparities in resources due to specific 
historic injustices. Two programs implemented as part of consent 
degrees in the context of fair housing litigation provide models for 
the types of prior practices that should merit such an exception. 
Chicago's Gautreaux program grew out of a legal challenge to 
the creation and maintenance of racial segregation in the Chicago 
Housing Authority's developments.276 Pursuant to a consent de-
cree, the program placed African-American households in public 
housing on a waiting list for Section 8 housing certificates. 277 As 
vouchers became available individuals on the waiting list were of-
fered the next available, unit, which could be in either a middle-
income white suburb or a low-income black urban neighbor-
27 4. For a concise history of public housing desegregation litigation, see Florence 
Wagman Roisman, Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing in Regional Housing Marhets: 
'rhe Baltimore Public Housing Desegregation Litigation, 42 WAKE FORES'!' L. REV. 333, 
336-46 (2007). 
275. For a discussion of the relationship between distributive and corrective justice, see 
generally Stephen R. Perry, On the Relationship Between Corrective and Distributive Jus-
tice, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 237-38 (Jeremy Horder ed., 2000). 
276. Two separate class actions were brought by tenants and applicants for public 
housing against the Chicago Housing Authority and against HUD. See Hills v. Gautreaux, 
425 U.S. 284, 297 (1976) (upholding remedial order against HUD that extended beyond 
Chicago's municipal boundaries); Gautreaux v. Chi. Rous. Auth., 436 F.2d 306, 313 (7th 
Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 922 (1971). A 1981 district court opinion detailed the 
"protracted post-judgment litigation" and reviewed the multiple legal decisions. Gautreaux 
v. Landrieu, 523 F. Supp. 665, 666-68 (N.D. Ill. 1981). See generally ALEXANDER 
POLIKOFF, WAITING FOR GAUTREAUX: A STORY OF SEGREGATION, HOUSING, AND THE BLACK 
GHE'l'TO (2006); Alexander Polikoff, Gautreaux and Institutional Litigation, 64 Cnr.-KENT 
L. REV. 451 (1988). 
277. Rosenbaum, supra note 19, at 232-33. 
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hood.278 The Gautreaux program provided extensive help to partic-
ipants in finding and visiting potential housing but little assis-
tance after the move, resulting in an average program cost of only 
$1000 per family. 279 
In a subsequent case in Baltimore, Thompson v. United States 
Department of Housing and Urban Development, a federal district 
court held that HUD had violated its duty, under the 1968 Civil 
Rights Act, "affirmatively to further" fair housing goals by failing 
"adequately to consider a regional approach to desegregation of 
public housing."280 The parties to the 2005 litigation had previous-
ly entered into a partial settlement in 1996, which established a 
mobility program that enables current or former residents of Bal-
timore City public housing (as well as individuals on the waiting 
list as of a specific date) to move to "opportunity neighbor-
hoods"-those with lower levels of poverty than the regional av-
erage.281 Program participants receive more substantial assistance 
than what was offered through the Gautreaux program, including 
housing search assistance, visits to units, financial literacy train-
ing, employment and transportation assistance, and post-move 
counseling for two years.282 
Empirical studies of housing mobility programs targeted at 
households in particularly disadvantaged locales indicate that in 
these situations the provision of additional resources produces 
substantial positive effects. Reviewing studies of housing mobility 
programs since the 1970s, Patrick Sharkey states that "a tenta-
tive conclusion from the evidence available suggests that a resi-
dential mobility approach is most likely to succeed if it is focused 
on families in the most severely disadvantaged, violent neighbor-
hoods across the country, and if it provides families with a sub-
278. Id. at 234. Under the terms of the consent decree establishing the program, the 
receiving suburbs were at least 70% white, but a small number of suburbs were excluded 
due to particularly high rents. Id. If a unit was in the suburbs, a household that preferred 
the city could refuse to accept it, but they were unlikely to rise to the top of the waiting list 
again. Id. 
279. Id. at 259-60. 
280. Thompson v. U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 348 F. Supp. 2d 398, 408 (D. Md. 
2005). See generally Roisman, supra note 274, at 353-89. 
281. LOHA ENGDAHL, POVERTY & RACE RESEARCH ACTION COUNCIL, NEW HOMES, NEW 
NEIGHBORHOODS, NEW SC!IOOLS: A PROGRESS REPORT ON THE BALTIMORE HOUSING 
MomLITY PIWGRAM 11-12 (2009), available at http://www.prrac.org/pdf/BaltimoreMobility 
Report.pdf. 
282. Id. at 14--21 (discussing in detail the mobility assistance services provided), by the 
Baltimore Housing Mobility Program). 
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stantial and sustained change in environment."283 Along these 
lines, a 1995 study of the Gautreaux program found that 64% of 
those who moved to the suburbs were employed following the 
move, compared to an employment rate of just 51 % for those who 
remained in the central city. 284 Summarizing multiple studies of 
the effects of the Gautreaux program, Sharkey notes: 
Not only did parents who were relocated to the suburbs experience 
substantial benefits arising from economic opportunities that were 
not available within Chicago's city limits, but the children in these 
"suburban" families started to show promising signs indicating fu-
ture success. Children in families that moved to suburban apart-
ments had substantially higher rates of high school completion, col-
lege attendance, and labor force participation than their 
h . d . h" Ch" 
285 
counterparts w o were ass1gne to apartments wit m icago. 
With these examples as a model, in situations where specific 
prior practices of discrimination and housing segregation have 
markedly and adversely affected the capacity of individuals to 
make use of an equal bundle of resources, limited divergence from 
the norm of equality should be permitted to remedy such prior in-
equities. Although this will not account for all inequities in initial 
resources, it provides a targeted and administratively feasible 
compromise that addresses an issue of particular salience in the 
context of housing. 
C. Housing Resource Bundles as a More Equitable Housing 
Assistance Policy 
Broadening the scope of our distributional analysis to include 
all federal housing assistance reveals an additional virtue of the 
housing resource bundle approach: it can readily incorporate the 
HMID. As noted earlier, the HMID skews the distribution of all 
federal housing assistance-both direct subsidies and tax expend-
itures-towards higher income households.286 It allocates substan-
tially more resources to these higher income individuals. 287 As 
283. SHAHKEY, STUCK IN PLACE, supra note 246, at 139. 
284. Rosenbaum, supra note 19, at 237. 
285. SHARKEY, STUCK IN PLACE, supra note 246, at 98. Sharkey does note that "this evi-
dence turned out to be somewhat less convincing than the early studies suggested, alt-
hough most of the early conclusions from the research continue to be supported even in 
follow-up studies of Gautreaux families." Id.; see also id. at 141-46 (providing more de-
tailed discussion of Gautreaux and Moving to Opportunity Studies). 
286. See supra Part II.C.2. 
287. Id. 
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noted earlier, twenty-five- to thirty-five-year-old homeowners 
with more than $250,000 in income save an average of $7077 
through the deduction.288 Those with incomes under $40,000 are 
able to reduce their tax bills by an average of only $208.289 
A commitment to distributing all federal housing assistance to 
provide for equality of resources would demand that the housing 
resource bundle approach be put in place for all citizens. Each in-
dividual would be limited in the total amount of housing assis-
tance they could receive during their lifetime. All citizens would 
receive an equal sum of housing resources, either through direct 
rental assistance or a deduction of mortgage interest (or some 
combination). This would result in a substantial change in the al-
location of resources, resulting in a more equitable distribution of 
all federal housing assistance. As noted earlier, at least two 
prominent economists have suggested integrating federal rental 
assistance into the tax code as a credit. 290 As John Quigley noted 
in making this suggestion, "Using the tax code to support low-
income renters may ... further national goals of equity in the tax 
treatment of housing by the federal government."2f)[ The bundle of 
resources approach does not necessitate allocating all forms of 
housing assistance-including low-income rental assistance-
through the tax code. Instead, one bundle could include a tax 
credit for homeownership while another could include a housing 
choice voucher. All that is needed is a valuation of each bundle 
that enables an equitable allocation. Approaching federal housing 
assistance from the perspective of equality of resources offers a 
practical mechanism for rendering these diverse forms of housing 
assistance more equitable and, most importantly, for highlighting 
and reforming the glaring inequities created by the HMID. 292 
288. Poterba & Sinai, supra note 122, at 88-89. 
289. Id. at 85 tbl.1. 
290. See supra notes 135-40 and accompanying text (discussing proposals by Ed Glae-
ser and John Quigley). 
291. Quigley, Rental Housing Assistance, supra note 140, at 151. 
292. See supra Part II.C.2. In contrast with the home mortgage interest deduction, in-
corporating the LIHTC into the bundle of resources approach would present more sub-
stantial practical challenges to implementation. It would require substantial changes to 
the LIH'I'C program's income targeting, in order to align it with that of the HUD-
administered rental assistance programs: calculation of the value of the benefit received 
by individual recipients; and a substantial reform of the administration of the LIHTC pro-
gram in order to allocate these units in parallel with the HUD programs. See supra Part 
II.C.1. 
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CONCLUSION 
Federal housing assistance has been enlisted to serve a diverse 
set of goals, but its primary function remains the provision of a 
specific resource-housing. Although equality may not be "the 
whole story in political morality," it should at least inform how 
we distribute limited resources. Shifting housing assistance to-
wards a distribution that better approximates an equality of re-
sources approach provides a means through which this specific 
resource can be allocated more equitably. It also provides recipi-
ents with greater freedom to make decisions that enable them to 
best pursue their personal goals, while indirectly furthering the 
secondary goals of federal housing policy. If we assume that the 
resources available for rental assistance will not increase, the 
bundle of resources approach provides a means to mitigate the 
potential hardships of the benefit reductions and time limits nec-
essary to more equitably distribute limited financial resources. If 
we instead look more broadly at all federal housing assistance-
including the home mortgage interest deduction-the bundle of 
resources approach provides a practical mechanism for achieving 
a more just distribution of the federal government's support for 
housing. 
